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Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian 
participation in the NATO-led 'peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any 
fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make 
Russian policies fully compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary 
economic, social,technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has 
yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory 
institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural 
traditions, including concepts 'of accountability and transparency, to make these 
adaptations in the near-term. Owing in part to its iJ?-stitutional shortcomings, severe 
socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength 
has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as 
their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that 
supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons 
stewardship has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia's 
reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency 
'toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic 
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Despite dramatic changes in the international environment and the Russian 
domestic scene since 1991, Russian strategic culture has not changed in its essence. The 
Russian worldview and long-standing patterns of behavior persist. Therefore, despite 
positive developments such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force 
in Bosnia and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, many 
Russians are likely to continue to see NATO as a threat rather than as a partner in 
international security. 
Institutional arrangements set up to promote effective interactions with Russian 
elites and to facilitate their cooperation with Western institutions, such as the NATO-
Russia Perrn,anent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace, have had only a limited 
impact. Russia's strategic culture has not changed in such a way as to make Russian 
policies fully compatible with t~ose of NATO countries in the econotnic, social, 
technological, and military spheres. Russian compatibility with the West depends upon 
creating, on the domestic scene, democracy and governmental ~d socioeconomic 
institutions conducive fo free-market economics. Russia has not yet succeeded in making 
these adaptations, however. These circumstances have led to socioeconomic setbacks, 
questions about the quality of Russia's nuclear weapons stewardship, and continued 
attitudes of suspicion and distrust toward NATO in the Russian geopolitical worldview. 
Russian leaders have been unable to' set up the mechanisms necessary to 
accomplish the transition from the USSR's state-centered command economy to a 
market-centered free-enterprise economy. They have not established the necessary legal, 
xi 
judicial, and regulatory institutions. The present Russian constitution lacks popular 
legitimacy, and the system of government remains one of presidential primacy. Despite 
this, entrenched regionalization of power and an ineffective federal bureaucracy have 
resulted in an overall weakening of the federal system, a situation that may continue for 
decades. 
Accountability and transparency are fundamental Western concepts which are 
alien to Russian culture. The lack of accountable and transparent legal, judicial, and 
regulatory institutions has adversely affected respect for property rights and contractual 
obligations in Russia. This situation has in tum affected both foreign and domestic 
investment, and has resulted in grave socioeconomic setbacks. 
The lack of accountability and transparency has also adversely affected Russia's 
ability to create a functioning and effective democracy. The Russians are accustomed to 
having an authoritarian government, a notable feature of which is the lack of 
accountability and transparency. Their disappointing experiment with pseudo-democracy 
as well as their unfortunate experience with ps~udo-capitalism have meant 
disillusionment, cynicism, disappointment, and possible future political volatility. It has 
also resulted in the Russian adoption of psychological defense mechanisms-for 
instance, finding fault with Western culture, and emphasizing Russia's supposed moral 
and cultural superiority. 
The Russian geopolitical stance and worldview have not been significantly 
modified since 1991. Russian elites remain suspicious of Western' intentions. Because of 
the economic and social chaos and a concomitant breakdown of the transportation and 
communications infrastructure, the quality of Russian nuclear weapons stewardship is 
xii 
.. 
being increasingly questioned. Russian conventional force strength has been 
dramatically weakened. The deterioration in the reliability of Russian early warning and 
surveillance systems, as well as the breakdown of basic supportive infrastructures such as 
personnel, supplies, and maintenance of nuclear weapons sites, have greatly exacerbated 
Russian anxiety and suspiciousness; and this situation could, in combination with other 
factors, lead to misinterpretations 'of events. Russia's reliance on nuclear weapons as the 
ultimate line of defense, coupled with its tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward 
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The purpose of this thesis is to advance understanding of the prospects for 
improved NATO-Russia relations, despite the complex concerns on both sides regarding 
nuclear weapons in Europe and the continuing process of NATO enlargement. The 
ultimate question, the thesis suggests, is whether Russia's strategic culture can change-
that is, whether the Russians can learn to see NATO as a partner in international security 
rather than a threat. 1 According to Ken Booth, 
The concept of strategic .culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, 
attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and 
particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with 
respect to the use of force.· A strategic culture is persistent over time, but 
neither particular elements nor a particular culture as a whole are 
immutable. Nevertheless, those elements together or in part deserving to 
be called "cultural" do tend to outlast all but major changes in military 
technology, domestic arrangements or the international environment. The 
strategic culture of a nation derives from its history, geography and 
political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and 
patterns of behaviour of the most influential voices; these may be, 
depending on the nation, the political elite, the military establishment 
and/or public opinion. The strategic culture defines a set of patterns of and 
for a nation's behaviour on war and peace issues. It helps shape but does 
not determine how a nation interacts with others in the security field ... 
Strategic culture helps shape behaviour on such issues as the use of force 
in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military 
relations and strategic doctrine. As a result of continuities in these 
matters, it is legitimate to talk about a particular national "style" in the 
theory and practice of strategy.2 
1 The views expressed in this thesis are that of the author's alone. It does not express the views of the 
Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government agency. 
2 Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture AffIrmed," in StrategiC Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. 
Jacobsen, (London, Macmillan, 1990), 121. 
Russia's "domestic arrangements" are clearly in flux, and this thesis takes that 
factor into account. The focus is, however, on examining whether the change in the 
"international environment" - to use Booth's phrase - has as yet been significant 
enough to bring about modifications in Russia's worldview and patterns of behavior. 
NATO is in the process of creating structures and arrangements that will 
ultimately affect the emerging security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
Integrating Russia into this security environment remains a crucial priority. This thesis 
attempts to assess the factors that might indicate the direction in which Russia is headed. 
For the next twenty years, Russia will probably concentrate on internal development and 
its traditional empire-building impulses will be in temporary abeyance.3 During this. 
period, the Russian people will probably have an "opportunity for reflection and debate 
about their national purpose" as well as for "the creation of new Russian political 
structures.',4 NATO enlargement nevertheless remains a deeply troubling development in 
the eyes of Russian elite groups. Although the general Russian population is concerned 
with the challenges of daily life, the elite groups "have been and remain generally 
opposed to NATO expansion.,,5 
The NATO Allies would prefer that Russia become an important partner of 
NATO, and that NATO and Russia progress to a new level of strategic cooperation, 
3 Brian R. Sullivan, "World of Great Powers," in 2015: Power and Progress, ed. Patrick M. Cronin. 
(Washington D. C. Natioml Defense University Press, 1996), 16. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Tom Angelakis, "Russian Elites' Perceptions of NATO Expansion: The Military, Foreign Ministry and 
the Duma," May 1997, 123. 
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including participation in the surveillance and monitoring of proliferation risks and other 
potential challenges to international peace and security. 
The potential contributions of the Russians are based on Russian strengths, such 
as decades of experience with the details of setting up and maintaining a reliable nuclear 
weapons monitoring and security system. At least until recently, Russia maintained a 
large scientific establishment. In addition, some Russians recognize that NATO is more 
than a coordinating body directing a common defense policy for the Allies in Western 
Europe and North America. NATO aiready has the basic structures set up for 
consultation and cooperation with Russia - above all, the NATO-Russia Permanent 
Joint Council (pJC). Moreover, Russia is a member of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
and has concluded an Individual Partnership Program (IPP) with NATO. 
Questions remain concerning the direction in which Russian policies may evolve 
over time. Getting the Russians to accept NATO as a constructive partner means getting 
rid of the old mindset in the Russian security establishment, and this could require a 
generational change. The old xenophobic ways of thinking that emphasize spheres of 
influence and fears of encirclement slow down the process of psychological 
accommodation to the new realities and opportunities. Russia is not far from the end of 
Boris Yeltsin's presidency and Western hopes for an early change of thinking by the 
Russian government have apparently been set back by the appointment, on 11 September 
3 
~---------------------------------- -
1998, of Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister. 6 As the former intelligence chief of the 
foreign service branch of the KGB (now called the foreign intelligence service, or SVR), 
Primakov is widely reported to maintain his longstanding connections with the security 
apparatus and to fervently support efforts to thwart U.S. and NATO interests.7 
The currently ambiguous NATO-Russia relationship may improve if Russian 
elites become more pragmatic, technocratic, and confident about the advantages of 
cooperating with the Alliance. The Russians recognize a zone of nuclear risk to the south 
and the east. Indeed, according to Sumner Benson, the Russians "have already agreed in 
principle to cooperate with the United States and Europe in developing a global missile 
defense system.,,8 
At the present time, three nuclear issues appear most significant: (a) Russian 
anxieties regarding NATO enlargement and hypothetical NATO deployments of nuclear 
weapons on the territory of new allies; (b) NATO's concerns about Russia's non-strategic 
6 According to one author, "Primakov has had a close relationship with the KGB all of his adult life. He 
was an influential pragmatist on behalf of Middle Eastern terrorist groups and reportedly a bag man for 
KGB money to Palestinian terrorists in the 1960's. He became a major figure in crafting the Brezhnev 
regime's expanded support for terrorist regimes to act as surrogates to attack the United States and its 
allies. He authored the Communist Party's ideological justification for the 1979 Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan, and was found to have been the principal guiding figure behind the 1989 crackdown on 
democratic, pro-independence activists in Azerbaijan in which 130 [people] were killed and more than 700 
wounded. Up through the present, he has been the most prominent source of diplomatic support for the 
Qaddafi and Saddam regimes to escape, international sanctions respectively for sheltering the suspects 
behind the 1988 bombing of an American jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, and for continuing 
clandestine weapons of mass destruction programs. He has never recanted." Russia Reform Monitor, no. 
514, 14 September 1998. Available at [http://www.afpc.org]; accessed 16 September 1998. 
7 Jeff Jacoby, "With Primakov, It's Back to the Cold War," Boston Globe, 17 September 1998,23. 
8 Sumner Benson, "Will NATO Deploy European Missile Defenses?" Comparative Strategy, vol. 16, 1. 
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nuclear weapons; and (c) NATO's interest in gaining Russian cooperation to deal with 
NBC proliferation. There are obviously other nuclear issues of importance - for 
instance, the future of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 
agreements and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These are, however, either 
U.S.-Russian matters (as with START) or global issues (as with the CTBT), rather than 
being NATO-Russian questions. 
This thesis critically evaluates the factors that support the likelihood of Russia 
becoming a true partner of NATO, as well as the factors that may promote the opposite 
outcome. In order to attain a careful evaluation of the possi?ility and likelihood of 
Russian-NATO cooperation, particularly regarding the nuclear .issues listed above, this 
thesis attempts to accomplish three tasks. 
The first task is to examine the current status .and principal characteristics of 
Russia's political culture. What institutions are the Russians building that may facilitate 
their successful cooperation with Western democracies? What are the schools of thought 
in Russian elite circles about the relations with the West? This part of the thesis draws on 
the Russian press, public opinion polls, and scholarly studies as gauges of the direction of 
Russian political culture. 
The second task is to analyze the current status of NATO's institutional 
arrangements set up to include the Russians as partners with NATO and to promote 
effective interactions with Russian elites. These institutiQnal arrangements include the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). With 
respect to these institutional arrangements, the features examined include their 
5 
inclusiveness, effectiveness, and seriousness of purpose (that is, actual implementation of 
formal commitments), plus the relationships among the organizations. Additionally, this 
thesis assesses the other facilitating organizational arrangements, such as the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council. 
The third task is to investigate the current status of NATO and Russian 
deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, the Alliance policy ofthe "Four No's," and 
the status of the integration of new members into the current NATO organization. 
According to the Founding Act, 
The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan 
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new 
members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture 
or nuclear policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. This 
subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, 
and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of 
those "members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage 
facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear 
storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the 
stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or 
below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing 
9 
weapons. 
B. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This" thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II offers background on the NATO 
enlargement debate, including the nature of the discussion in the Uriited States 
concerning the wisdom and extent of NATO expansion. Particular emphasis is given to 
the fear of alienating Russia by expanding NATO into Central Europe, and thereby 
9 NATO, "The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation, signed at Paris, 27 May 1997," NATO Review, June-July 
1997, 7-8. Available online at [http:www.nato.int]; accessed 10 June 1998. 
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undennining prospects for obtaining Russia's cooperation in nuclear matters, as against 
the dangers posed by leaving a power vacuum in Central Europe as a result of not 
expanding NATO. 
Chapter III examines the current status and principal characteristics of Russian 
political culture with regard to foreign relations, particularly the resistance of the Russian 
elites to NATO enlargement. Furthennore, this chapter also examines· the potential 
impact of NATO enlargement on Russia's foreign policy and strategic posture. 
Chapter N offers an examination of Russia's military doctrine, nuclear 
capabilities and strategic posture. It examines the Russian decision, in view of its 
conventional force weakness, to abandon the 1982 Soviet "no first use" pledge. Finally, 
this chapter discusses the threat posed by what may be unsatisfactory Russian 
. stewardship of non-strategic nuclear weapons, in the context of the disastrous breakdown 
of social and economic structures in Russia. 
Chapter V examines efforts by the NATO Allies to create reassuring and inclusive 
institutions to aid in the effort to integrate Russia into the evolving security architecture 
of the Euro-Atlantic region. It further examines the reasons for Russian reluctance to 
participate wholeheartedly in this effort. These reasons include distrust of Allied motives 
and strategies, especially with respect to the hypothetical abandonment of the "Four 
No's" policy of non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the three new 
members of NATO. 
Chapter VI outlines conclusions concerning Russian strategic culture, particularly 
as to whether the Russians are likely, in the present domestic tunnoil, to become true 
7 
partners of NATO. In the context of the present disastrous social and economic 
circumstances, including an impoverished military and potentially unsatisfactory nuclear 
weapons stewardship, the prospects for a favorable outcome seem bleak. The concluding 
chapter includes an examination of Russia's inability to date to create economic and 
governmental institutions that could facilitate Russia's integration into the Western 
community of democratic states. The analysis concludes with an evaluation of the 
possibility that the Russians may not only fail to become true partners of NATO, but 
instead may actually prepare for a renewed Cold War. 
8 
II. OVERVIEW OF NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Decisions 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally created in 1949-
50 to resist an expansive Soviet Union. During the Cold War, NATO acquired additional 
functions and purposes, such as providing a framework for the establishment of West 
Gennan anned forces. lo When Soviet Communism broke apart and the Red Anny's 
brutal forty-five year occupation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) ended abruptly, 
the world security environment made a historic transfonnation. The global ideological 
thrust of Leninist foreign policy collapsed in a heap. However, since the end of the Cold 
War the world has not become a safer place. In fact, in many ways,it has become much 
more dangerous. A new phase in the security arrangements and defense organizations of 
Europe began when the Cold War ended, precipitating a debate about the nature and 
extent of the adjustments demanded by the changed conditions. 
The debate has focused on enlargement of the existing security and defense 
arrangements, the most important of which is NATO. However, at the same time, there 
has been an increasing web of cross membership and interrelationships among many of 
the security institutions, related to Europe. 1I Additionally, an extensive collection of 
10 West Germany was eventually admitted into NATO in 1955. 
11 James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments, McNair Paper 40, 
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), vi. 
9 
alternative security arrangements has been considered, with recommendations made for 
promoting an extensive array of European-related security organizations including: (1) 
the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), (2) the NACC 
(North Atlantic Cooperation Council), (3) the PiP (Partnership for Peace), (4) the EU 
(European Union) and (5) the WEU (Western European Union). The NACC was 
replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997. 
2. Possible Alternative Security Configurations 
A dizzying array of several possible alternative security configurations was 
proposed in the early 1990s by various groups. Among the significant suggestions 
offered about how the security alignments might change were the following basic 
fi . 12 con guratlOns: 
a. If NATO Expands 
• NATO could expand to include only states from Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), or 
• NATO could expand to include some CEE plus some Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) countries, or 
• NATO could extend membership to all Partnership for Peace (PiP) partners. 
h. If NATO Does NOT Expand 
• NATO's size could stay the same, at sixteen members, and NATO could 
simply continue cooperation with Eastern European countries under EAPC 
and PiP, or 
• the principal security umbrella for European security could be changed to the 
OSCE, with NATO and the CIS as the supporting pillars of the umbrella, or 
12 Ibid., 117-118. 
10 
• the EU ·and the WEU could become the chief elements of the European 
security umbrella, expanding to include most of the CEE states, and NATO 
would remain static at sixteen members. 
3. Early Debate and History of the Decision to Enlarge 
When the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended, followed by the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact in 1991, a power "vacuum,,,\3 or large neutral area, appeared in Central 
and Eastern Europe. In response to this development, "many public officials and private 
citizens in Central and Eastern Europe began expressing the desire for their countries to 
.. NATO ,,14 Jom . By the same token, many countries in the area also applied for 
membership in the European Union (EU).15 "Instability and uncertainty in Russia, 
Ukraine, and elsewhere in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and possible· 
Russian imperialistic and expansionistic tendencies, are viewed in Central and Eastern 
European states as the greatest threats to their· national security. Individual states see 
themselves as incapable of coping alone with the magnitude of these challenges. They 
see NATO as the most capable security institution to help protect them against these 
threats, particularly because of U.S. involvement.,,16 
In 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); which, 
as noted above, was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC) in May 
1997. In addition to this, in January 1994 NATO created the Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
an initiative with various purposes, including to aid in the process of getting prospective 
13 Kissinger, cited in ibid., 30. 
14 Ibid., 21. 
15 Ibid., vi. 
16 Ibid., 31. 
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members ready to become full members. 17 The overall aim of the PfP is to aid in the 
creation of a common approach to security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic region. 
Specifically "the PfP became an instrument for building closer relationships with our new 
Partners to the East. Through PfP the East and the West seek to build the habits of 
consultation, trust and cooperation. Much of its cooperation is in the military sphere. At 
the same time PfP-countries build common ideas and approaches to peacekeeping and 
humanitarian support operations. We also aim to introduce a planning system that has 
played a major part in enhancing Alliance solidarity and underpinning the integrated 
military structure.,,18 Moreover, in January 1994, regarding the PfP, the NATO heads of 
state and government declared: 
The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the 
North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the 
North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace.... [W]e will work in 
concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting 
democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military 
exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such 
fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, 
and others as may be needed.19 
Russian responses at that ti~e were mixed. In 1993, Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin wrote to Western leaders expressing concern that NATO expansion would tend to 
isolate Russia and asked that membership be open-ended and,not exclude Russia itself. 
17 Ibid., vi. 
IS Willy Claes, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Athintic Security Architecture," NATO Review, January 
1995. Available at [http://www.nato.intldoculreview/articles/9501-l.htm]; accessed 5 June 1998. 
19 NATO, Declaration of the Heads o(State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in 
Brussels, NATO Press Communique M-l(94)3, 11 January 1994. Available at 
[http://www.nato.intldoculcomm/c940111a.htm]; accessed 5 June 1998. 
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Moderating his tenus by characterizing NATO membership for Russia as "purely 
theoretical," Yeltsin further suggested that a NATO-Russian relationship should be 
"several degrees warmer than the relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe."zo 
The NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels on 1 December 1994 with the 
assignment to "begin an examination inside the Alliance to 'detenuine how NATO will 
enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications for membership. ",21 
Expansion to include the first wave of new members began in Madrid in July 1997, when 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, were invited to begin talks concerning 
adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty. 
4. Open-Endedness . 
At the present time, in addition to the three countries listed above, nine other 
countries have applied for membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Some observers judge that the most 
probable and most qualified candidate countries for a "second tranche of NATO 
enlargement" are Slovenia, .Romania, the three Baltic States, and perhaps Austria.22 
Future membership in NATO depends in part on candidates meeting specific criteria, 
including (a) having their military forces under democratic and, civilian control, (b) 
resolving border and minority disagreements with their neighboring countries, and (c) 
making effective efforts to create stable free-market democracies. 
20 Yeltsin, quoted in Morrison, 1995,23. 
21 Ibid., 24. 
22 However, Vienna has not yet initiated a dialogue with NATO about possible admission. 
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Debate and· pressure for NATO enlargement have been especially strong in 
Germany. Among the key issues under consideration by well-informed observers in the 
various NATO member countries are: (a) the potential effects of enlargement on "alliance 
cohesion," (b) the implications for unsuccessful first-wave applicants or "also-rans," (c) 
"the risk of unnecessary confrontation with Russia," and (d) reservations over "the 
gravity of accepting new collective defense obligations.,,23 Open-endedness implies an 
"'inclusive' process of indefinite scope and duration.,,24 That is, it implies that the 
applicant countries should not give up hope.' This "open-ended process is seen as the 
necessary complement to taking in only a few new allies.,,25 This is necessary "in order 
to avoid implying there is a 'permanent exclusion' of some countries," an implication that 
might have destabilizing effects.26 
B. NATO RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
1. NATO-Russia Founding Act 
It has been clear to Western leaders that open-endedness in the NATO 
enlargement process is not adequate to the task of dealing with Russia. The challenge of 
developing constructive relations with Russia is a unique one, and recommendations were 
accordingly made for developing a unique forum for cooperation and dialogue between 
NATO and Russia.27 Hence, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, seen as the solution to the 
23 David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security (Washington, 
D.C.: The United States Institute for Peace, 1998), 117. 
24 Ibid., 119. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Morrison, 1995, 129. 
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special challenge of Russia, was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The NATO-Russia 
Founding Act called for the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, 
a vehicle providing a forum for consultations, cooperation, and coordination with Russia. 
In support of this historic achievement, prominent NATO officials have asserted that 
because the new European security environment has changed so fundamentally, "it is 
only natural that a new Russia and a new NATO have become partners.,,28 
2. NATO's "Four No's" Policy and How it Emerged 
To the Russians, the most troubling aspect of NATO enlargement has been the 
potential deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members. The 
NATO-Russia Founding Act of27 May 1997 clearly states a policy of non-deployment in 
the foreseeable future: 
The member states of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan, 
and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, 
nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear 
policy - and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the 
fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason 
to establish nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of those new 
members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage 
facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. 29 
The NATO-Russia Founding Act with its stated policy of the "Four No's" was 
developed to assuage Russian concerns and to respond to the widespread conviction in 
Russia that Russia has been betrayed by the NATO powers. The betrayal that the 
Russians claim to have suffered resides in what they feel is a violation of implicit 
28 Ulrich Brandenburg, "NATO and Russia: A Natural Partnership," NATO Review, July-August 1997, 17-
18. 
29 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 7-8. 
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understandings and promises made by U.S. President George Bush to Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta in 1989 that, if the Russians would permit Germany to 
reunify, the "quid pro quo" would be that NATO would not expand.3D Though apparently 
all that President Bush offered was a vague verbal assurance that the West would "not 
seek to profit" from Moscow's weakness, it is nevertheless an instance of what the 
Russians consider a breach of faith. This interpretation of events contributes to the 
tendency of Russians to see themselves as victims of machinations and treachery by the 
Western powers and to distrust the statement of the "Four No's." Furthermore, it affects 
Russian strategic thinking and reinforces the tendency to cling to the old Cold War views 
of NATO as the enemy. 
3. Further NATO Enlargement Questions 
Other questions related to NATO enlargement that had to be answered included: 
(a) the criteria for membership, (b) whether to offer full or partial membership, (c) which 
countries should be invited, (d) the timing and sequencing of enlargement, (e) the 
problem of tension between states asked to join and those ''waitlisted,'' (f) the role of 
public opinion in the countries involved, and (g) the impact of proposed enlargement on 
NATO's effectiveness.31 
The debate in 1993-95 examined how NATO enlargement would improve 
security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), thereby avoiding a security 
30 Jonathan Eyal, ''NATO's Enlargement, Anatomy of a Decision," International Affairs, October 1997, 
699. 
31 Morrison, 1995, viii-xi. 
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vacuum, nationalization of defenses, and an East-West clash. By providing greater 
security to the Central and Eastern European states, NATO would be increasing the 
likelihood that those countries would become stable democracies.32 Thus, the argument 
was that enlargement should begin at a time when any threat from the Russians was 
minimaL 33 
Those who argued against NATO enlargement countered that expansIon was not 
necessary, since, with the demise of the Soviet Union, no threat existed.34 Other 
arguments claimed that expansion would actually deepen divisions in Europe, since there 
would be a demarcation between those who had been invited to join NATO and those 
. . 
who had not, and that this would in fact result in new bloc formations, tensions, and 
confrontations. The exact nature of the security commitments involved was also a 
concern. The NATO decision-making processes, already cumbersome, might become 
more SO.35 
The debate about long-term strategy suggested that before enlargel11ent could take 
place, other questions would first need to be addressed, and that more time and study 
were needed to answer them. These issues included defining the nature of NATO 
transatlantic relationships, working out the ~etails of the NATO-Russia relationship, and 
32 Ibid. 




conducting a more extensive public debate. Some argued that invitations to join NATO 
could be deferred until such time as an actual threat from Russia became evident. 36 
c. U.S. DEBATE ABOUT NATO ENLARGEMENT 
In the final analysis, the decisions made in the United States will be the deciding 
factor concerning the shape of NATO enlargement. In 1994, President Clinton stated that 
NATO expansion was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how.,,37 
The long-term strategic relationship between the United States and its European 
allies depends on the American role as sec~rity guarantor and pacifier.38 This umbrella 
role is crucial to its present NATO leadership. America is the "key agent in the 
construction of an interstate order in Western Europe that muted, if not removed, ancient 
conflicts and shaped conditions for cooperation.,,39 The most important aspect of this 
leadership role is the "essentially unilateral American security guarantee.',40 That role 
continues to this day, and e~tends to the countries in the first tranche of NATO 
enlargement. This is the basis of the long-term strategic alliance between Canada, the 
United States, and several European nations. 
Although U.S. leadership is the crucial factor, U.S. leadership regarding 
enlargement has not always been as forthcoming as it is at the present time. For example, 
during the early phase of President Clinton's first administration, the U.S. did not 
36 Ibid., viii. 
37 President Clinton, cited in ibid., 1. 




vigorously support NATO enlargement as an urgent priority. Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry discussed the merits of expansion 
for years, owing to a judgment that more examination, debate, and time were needed to 
deal with the vexing questions.41 Christopher and Perry together wrote against 
enlargement in February 1995, saying, "If we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some 
countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering 
complacency in countries that are. ,,42 
1. Early Debate in the U.S. 
Such well-qualified observers as Henry Kissinger, who served as Secretary of . 
State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Ronald Asmus of the RAND 
Corporation, suggested NATO enlargement as early as 1991-92. However, earnest 
. discussion about the topic was not Undertaken unti11993, prior to the NATO summit in 
Brussels in January 1994.43 Clearly, there were uncertain and distressing questions from 
the beginning. The questions included "how far it should go, who should be invited to 
join (and at what point), who will pay for it, what its real purposes are," and "how to 
console those left out of the first round of enlargement.',44 These issues "have emerged as 
the most obvious signs of how difficult NATO is finding the challenge of building a new 
41 Morrison, 1995,42. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Yost, 1998, 102. 
44 Ibid., 100. 
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security order to prevent and contain conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region.,,45 Moreover, 
these questions are still being debated in earnest at the present time. 
2. For Enlargement 
Proponents of NATO enlargement in the United States have included: (a) Senator 
Richard Lugar, (b) former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, (c) former U.S. 
Presidential National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, (d) former National Security 
Council official Peter Rodman, and (e) New York Times columnist William Safire.46 In 
addition, leading political analysts at the Rand Corporation, such as Ronald Asmus, 
Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, have also been strong s~pporters of expansion, 
writing that the inclusion of the Visegrad states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Slovakia) "would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide 
greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues.',4? 
a. Stability in Europe as a Vital American Interest 
Senator Richard Lugar wrote in 1993 that "defining the current problems 
in terms of the future of Europe as a whole helps clarify the issue of vital American 
national interests. The United States cannot afford to allow Europe to unravel for the 
third time this century. Projection of sta~ility to the East is a prudent investment to 
secure the peace in Europe.',48 Furthermore, Senator Lugar wrote that "membership in 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. ' 
47 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Lugar, and Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," Foreign Affairs, 
September-October 1993,28-40, cited in Morrison, 1995, 3l. 
48 Lugar, cited in ibid., 30. 
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NATO is a way to strengthen domestic forces committed to democracy and market 
economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend to overlook the link between 
democracy and security.',49 
h. The Security Vacuum 
Henry Kissinger, also an early advocate of expansion, wrote that "the 
expansion issue arose because Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary - all 
victims of Soviet occupation - sought NATO membership."so Kissinger further warned 
not to allow a "vacuum between Germany and Russia that tempted so many previous 
conflicts."Sl In 1994 he wrote, "if this request [the Visegrad states' requests to join 
NATO] is rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused protection, Germany 
will sooner or later seek to achieve its security by national efforts, encountering on the 
way, a Russia pursuing the same policy from its side.',52 
c. Keeping NATO Vital 
. In 1994, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that in order to keep NATO a vital 
and energized organization, it was necessary to provide "a long-range design for Europe," 
and that "hesitation, inconsistency and weakness will not only discredit American 
leadership but probably doom NATO altogether."s3 
49 Ibid., 33. 
50 Ibid., 29. 
51 Ibid., 30. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Zbigniew Brzezinski, ''NATO - Expand or Die?," New York Times, 28 December 1994, A15. 
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d. Avoiding Ambiguity and Uncertainty 
Peter Rodman, a former National Security Council official, wrote that, "if 
the history of this century proves anything, it is that ambiguity about the status of these 
small Central European states is exceedingly risky for peace. It would only invite future 
revisionist temptations. In the interest of European stability, the uncertainty should be 
foreclosed by their admission to the alliance."S4 
3. Against Enlargement 
When NATO was first formed in 1949, there was opposition from a political 
triangle of (1) isolationists, (2) defense hawks, and (3) liberal internationalists.55 
According to Jeremy Rosner, a well-qualified and informed observer of NATO 
enlargement, the same three groups are again forming the principal opposition.
56 
Isolationists, such as Patrick Buchanan, a former official in the Reagan 
administration, have worried about the Article 5 defense commitments that enlargement 
might entail. For example, Buchanan wrote in late 1993, "the United States cannot, and 
must not, give Poland and other East European countries the guarantee that it would go to 
war,because oftheir eastern borders, as would follow from their admission into NATO.,,57 
Others who are not isolationists doubt whether NATO is the most appropriate 
vehicle for achieving stability in Central Europe. For example, former Senator Sam 
54 Peter W. Rodman, "4 More for NATO: The Biggest Problem here is not Russia's Behavior but the 
Administration's," Washington Post, 13 December 1994, A27. ' 
55 Rosner, cited in Yost, 1998, 105. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Buchanan, cited in Morrison, 1995,40 
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Nunn of Georgia, a longtime defense expert, is said to prefer using membership in the 
European Union (EU) rather than NATO as the main vehicle for stabilizing Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). The "father of containment," George F. Kennan, is also genuinely 
concerned that U.S. interests would not be served by any NATO enlargements at 
58 present. 
4. General Implications 
a. Open-Endedness and NATO-Russia Relations 
Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists argued against 
enlarging NATO on the grounds that it is going to be much more costly than the $30 
billion estimated by the State Department source. Dean stated at the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee hearings that enlarging NATO "will be costly, risky, and above all, 
unnecessary.,,59 The open-endedness issue is, in Dean's view, the most distressing aspect, 
and is likely, in a runaway enlargement process, to result in an eventual cost to the United 
States of "$90 to $150 billion.,,60 Furthermore, De~ stated,"If the Baltic states do 
become members of NATO, then the costs to present NATO members of making a 
realistic effort to defend the countries, which border Russia at the Eastern end of the 
Baltic Sea, will include very large increases in NATO's force projection capabilities, 
including naval forces and combat aircraft, and, quite probably, explicit reliance on 
58 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Wellstone, testifying concerning Senator 
Sam Nunn, and George F. Kennan, The Debate OyJ NATO Enlargement, Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 10Sth Cong., 1st sess', 63. 
59 Testimony of Jonathan Dean, Senior Arms Control Advisor, Union of Concerned Scientists, cited in The 
Debate on NATO Enlargement, 1998,67. 
60 Ibid., 68 .. 
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nuclear weapons, matching a parallel and ominous development in Russian nuclear 
weapons policy.,,61 
Moreover, according to Dean, NATO's enlargement is risky if open-
ended, because it would "dangerously expand the scope of current United States security 
commitments.,,62 In addition, Dean expressed apprehension and fear that Russia would 
feel encircled by open-ended in enlargement, and that it would be dangerous to 
antagonize a country with Russia's supply of nuclear weapons.63 Further, Dean stated 
that "what [the] Eastern European countries most want and most need is a form of 
membership in the Western community that provides support for their growing economic, 
and social and political structures.,,64 Finally, Dean stated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
as an adequate alternative to NATO expansion.65 
h. Concerns about Russia 
In the United States, other foreign affairs specialists ~h? feel that 
American interests are best served by maintaining good relations with Russia include 
Fred C. 1k16, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Charles Kupchan, a former 
member of the U.S. National Security Council Staff; and Michael Brown of Harvard 
U . . 66 lllverslty. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 68-69. 
64 Ibid., 69 
65 Ibid. 
66 Morrison, 1995,35. 
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Fred C. 1k16 feels that American interests are best served by soothing and 
coaxing the former Soviet superpower into helping solve the world's current problems, 
rather than creating a Russia that would be irritated by giving NATO membership to 
Central and Eastern European neighbors. Furthermore, America's best interests, Ikl6 
argues, are to look upon Russia as a potential partner in dealing with a dangerous and 
uncertain world ahead. Russian nuclear threats in the context of NATO expansion are 
also a concern, and Ikl6 feels that American interests are better served by making sure 
America and Russia cooperate, especially in the area of preventing the proliferation of 
f d . 67 weapons 0 mass estructlOn. 
Other well-qualified observers who oppose NATO expansion feel that it. 
would exclude Russia, and hence might cause Russia to be "resentful, less cooperative, 
and perhaps adversariaL,,68 Included in this group of scholars is Charles Kupchan; 
formerly of the National Security Council, who has argued that America's interests are 
best served by !lot missing an opportunity to build greater security. Fundamentally, 
Kupchan is concerned about building a cooperative relationship with Russia, rather than 
creating new lines of division in Europe. Furthermore, he stated that "pushing NATO's 
boundaries eastward promises to resurrect Europe's dividing lines, not erase them. The 
chance to build a European security community that included Russia will be lost. The 
67 Fred C. TIde, cited in Timothy R. Trampenau, "NATO Expansion and the Baltic States," (Master's 
Thesis, The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1996), 56. 
68 Morrison, 1995,36. . 
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West might be larger and stronger, but Europe would again be divided into hostile 
halves. ,,69 
c. Spheres of Influence 
Michael Brown of Harvard University has argued that admission of the 
four Visegrad states would be counterproductive because, "in all probability, Russian 
leaders would interpret NATO expansion as a delineation of spheres of influence in 
Central Europe and they would move to establish greater control over non-NATO areas. 
Russian aggression would be encouraged, not discouraged, by NATO expansion.,,70 
d. Weakening Democratic Forces in Russia 
Other well-qualified observers who support closer ties with Russia feel 
this would be in America's long range interests for three reasons. 
• First, they want to assist Russia "in its progress towards democracy, to 
continue with arms control negotiations, and to secure assistance in 
responding to international crises.,,7! Michael Mandelbaum, Professor and 
Director of Foreign Policy at the Nitze School of Johns Hopkins University, 
for example, reportedly argues that a '''neo-containment' policy of NATO 
enlargement would run the risk of weakening democratic forces in Russia, and 
if imposed, would be seen as illegitimate by the Russians. This illegitimacy 
would give a revisionist Russia reason to try to undermine the fragile 
Europe~ order."n . 
• Second, those who emphasize that good U.S.-Russian relations are important 
to the overall security of the United States claim that Russia's cooperation is 
needed to counter the threats that are likely to emerge in the future: more 
specifically, the dangers posed by rogue states' possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) and the risks i,n further WMD proliferation. 
69 Charles Kupchan, cited in ibid., 37. 
70 Michael Brown, cited in ibid., 39. 
71 Trarnpenau, 1996, 54. 
72 Michael Mandelbaum, cited in ibid. 
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• Third, a strategic alliance with Russia in the future may be imperiled by 
actions today. Hence, there is concern that Russian help may be needed to 
contain a robust giant looming on the horizon - that is, China.73 According 
to Stephan Sestanovich, "A Russia oriented to the West would be needed to 
build an effective coalition against an aggressive China. In fact, it is possible 
that good relations between Russia and the West could deter China from 
taking risks that might make a coalition necessary.,,74 
D. THE OUTCOME OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE 
At Stanford University in May 1997, James E. Goodby predicted that the most 
likely outcome of the debate to enlarge NATO will be to "enlarge and then have a lengthy 
pause for a period of consolidation.,,75 With the invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic in the summer of 1997, Goodby's prediction has so far proven correct. 
Furthermore, the first tranche of post-Cold War NATO enlargement is now nearly 
accomplished. On 30 April 1998, the United States Senate approved a resolution of 
ratification to add the three new members to NATO, thus bringing their membership one 
step closer to reality. Accessio~ will take place only after all sixteen current allies ratify 
the protocols of accession, as anticipated. However, NATO enlargement remains 
controversial and the debates continue, especially in Russia. Moreover, open-endedness 
in the membership proces~ may be put on hold, primarily because "given Russian 
opposition to accession to NATO of any newly independent state that emerged from the 
73 China sees itself as the "Middle Kingdom" (the center of the Universe) and is long-lived strategically in-
terms of future Milleniurns. 
74 Stephen Sestanovich, cited in Trampenau, 1996,57. 
75 James E. Goodby, "NATO Enlargement and an Undivided Europe," Payne Lecture at Stanford 
University, 8 May 1997, 3. 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, there will be considerable hesitation, at least in Western 
Europe, about a second round of expansion.,,76 
According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "the real nature of the debate is about the 
long-term historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe."n Brzezinski 
states categorically that "NATO's enlargement is not principally about the Russian threat, 
for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its reappearance and hence 
some insurance against it is desirable.,,78 He further states that neither is NATO 
expansion "primarily a moral crusade, meant to undo the injustice the Central European 
people suffered during the half-century long of Soviet oppression.,,79 According to 
Brzezinski, NATO enlargement is about nothing short of "America's role in Europe, 
whether America will remain a European power and whether a larger, democratic Europe 
will remain organically linked to America.,,80 Brzezinski's interpretation of the Russia 
question is that "NATO and the European· Union have creatively resolved the old 
question of disproportionate German power in Europe. The progressive expansion of 
NATO can similarly resolve the question of disproportionate Russian power in Europe.,,81 
Furthermore, Brzezinski stated that maintaining the American military presence in 
Europe is "central to nothing less than global stability... Europe is the place in which 
some of the worst human suffering and some of the worst tragedies of this century were 
76 Ibid. 







precipitated. We were dragged into two world wars by the dynamics of European 
1·· ,,82 po ltICS. 
Henry Kissinger when called to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, strongly urged the Senate to ratify NATO expansion. In a prepared 
statement, he said that the stakes in NATO enlargement are "large, for the nations of the 
Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the twO.,,83 
Kissinger further stated that "a major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for 
European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of 
German domination; France would. see reinsurance in a Russiap. option. ,,84 He further 
stated that "an American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium.,,85 
1. . Continuing Concerns About Russia 
With respect to the problem of Russian sensitivities, Kissinger stated that "critics 
of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia. and therefore 
magnifies perils rather than allays them. I hold the opposite view.,,86 Kissinger went on 
to say that "failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion between 
Germany and Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a political 
earthquake threatening vital American interests.,,87 According to Kissinger, "NATO 
82 Ibid. 
83 Kissinger, cited in ibid., 186. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 184 
. 87 Ibid., 187 
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expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of 
alienating Russia, against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between 
Gennany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable.,,88 
On the other hand, the Russians, who claim to want to be included in a Western 
security arrangement,89 continue to behave in an inconsistent and contradictory fashion. 
In the present tunnoil, the problem for both NATO and Russia remains whether Russian 
domestic circumstances will develop in such a way as to lead Russia on a logical and 
practical path to a genuine security partnership with NATO. It is entirely possible that 
some Russians are planning for a future without NATO partnership. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Pushkov, "Don't Isolate Us, A Russian View of NATO Expansion," National Interest, Spring 1997, 62. 
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III. RUSSIAN POLITICAL REACTIONS TO NATO 
ENLARGEMENT, NOTABLY WITH RESPECT TO 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES 
A. FOREWORD 
Although the domestic scene in Russia has altered dramatically from what it was 
in 1991, the necessary governmental and socioeconomic adaptations to integrate Russia 
into Western economic and monetary institutions have failed to develop.90 The reasons 
for this failure have not been hostility to the expansion of NATO, but the incapacity of 
the leadership to set up transitional mechanisms through which the Russian government 
could accomplish the transition from a state-centered command economy to a private-
enterprise economy. The resulting chaos has provided an opportunity for some 
. individuals to take advantage of the situation to transfer Russian wealth and 
governmental administrative capacity to themselves. 
Owing in part to their disappo.inting experiment with pseudo-democracy and their 
unfortunate experience with a grossly distorted form of capitalism, the Russians are now 
in a·condition of economic collapse and social catastrophe, with the great majority of the 
90 Below are listed some of the possible economic and governmental institutions that would be necessary to 
build an economy that would (1) attract foreign investment, (2) help pave the way for the transition from a 
command (communist) economy to a free market (capitalist) economy, and (3) help build the infrastructure 
needed in order to establish stronger ties to the Western economic institutions. The list would include a 
body of commercial law that clearly defmes contracts, including the obligations and rights (including 
property rights) associated with contracts; standard Western accounting methods and procedures; an 
UD.corrupt state licensing body; a judicial system capable of settling contractual disputes fairly; a system of 
taxation which is clearly defmed and capable of actually accomplishing tax collection; and a fair and 
uncorrupt system of law enforcement. 
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Russian people deprived of an adequate standard of living. Although politiGally they 
have more freedom,91 the majority of the Russian people may be worse off materially 
than they were under comllunism. The benefits of the economic changes that have taken 
place during the last seven years appear to have gone to a small group of people who have 
plundered the wealth of the Russian state by taking ownership of former state property for 
grossly distorted low prices, and who have subsequently sent profits gained thereby 
outside the country to foreign banks. This evident lack of confidence in the future 
economic development of their own country, and the obvious lack of commitment to 
building Russia's economic future. contributed to the general. cynicism not only of 
Russia's citizens, but also of foreign investors. In addition, it is likely that some Russians 
feel an emotional and irrational need to blame someone for their current plight - e.g., the 
American and other Western economic advisers ofYeltsin's government. Some Russians 
clearly suspect that the real motivation behind American encouragement of Russian 
"democracy" was to rob Russia of its empire, as well as to take away the military and 
strategic strength ofthe Russian superpower. 
Because crop failures and low food stores have led to the likelihood of food 
shortages during the coming winter, the R~ssian government has found it necessary to 
play the role of a petitioner seeking emergency deliveries of food from the West. 
Because of their need for help, and because of the generosity of Western countries, the 
Russians will probably show a cooperative attitude of outward compliance with 
91 For the ordinary Russian citizens, there is an unprecedented level of freedom of speech, freedom of 
political affiliation, and freedom of assembly. 
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international nonns and treaties In matters such as terrorism and expansionism. 
Furthennore, the Russians may display an apparent attitude of peacefulness and 
cooperation with the NATO alliance countries, including the United States. Similarly, 
Russian dependence on the international community will probably continue for the next 
several years, because of the country's economic prostration. The organization of food-
producing capacity will take some time to accomplish; however, this will be not only 
because of the difficulties of economic and social reconstruction, but also because of the 
diversion of funds to military use. With the overwhelming loss of geopolitical status and 
fears of encirclement, as well as the hostility of Russian elites to the expansion of NATO, 
some Russian leaders may yearn for an eventual return to Russia's fonner power. The 
outwardly compliant and restrained Russia may mask persistent efforts to recover 
Russian strength, military capabilitY, and strategic power. One of the instruments of 
Russian power will in all likelihood be nuclear weapons. 
B. RUSS~AN POLITICAL REACTIONS TO NATO ENLARGEMENT 
At the present time, "the Russian elites have been and remain generally opposed 
to NATO expansion."9~ The current view from Russia is that "the prospect of NATO 
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has become the most important and 
potentially explosive issue of Russia's foreign policy. It should also be regarded as the 
ultimate test of Russia's relationship with the West... No other issue can harm this 
relationship to the extent that NATO enlargeme,nt would. From Moscow's perspective, 
92 Ange1akis, 1997, 1. 
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NATO's decision over whether or not to enlarge to the east will shape the relationship 
between Russia and the West for the next period of world history.,,93 
Russian attitudes to NATO have varied over time from hostility to indifference.
94 
During the last few years of the Soviet Union, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 
1985, "NATO did not become a matter of high political or strategic concern for Soviet 
leaders and public opinion. Mikhail Gorbachev's concept of a common European house 
was for many Russians a welcome change from the Cold War division of Europe.,,95 
"After the failure of the August 1991 coup, those who adhered to the old concept of 
NATO as Russia's enemy (e.g. orthodox communists, KGB officers, part of the members 
of the military, government officials, and military-industrial complex) became disoriented 
and weakened by the Soviet Union's dissolution, and neutralized temporarily as a 
political force.,,96 
After the collapse of the Soviet Uriion in December 1991, in the early part of 
Russian President Boris "Yeltsin's rule, the liberal political establislunent in Russia did 
n~t consider NATO to be a serious problem.,,97 The emphasis at that time was on 
"integration into international economic and financial institutions (e.g., the IMF, the 
World Bank, and GATT). Russia largely thought that NATO would change by itself.,,98 
93 Alexander Pushkov, "A View from Russia," in NATO Enlargement. Opinions and Options, ed. Jeffrey 
Simon. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), 123. 
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"Russia's geopolitical interests were virtually absent from Ye1tsin's early foreign policy 
doctrine; the Alliance was not seen as a potential threat.,,99 
By 1993, for various reasons, the "political honeymoon with Russia was ending, 
[and] the debates in the United States and other Alliance member-states began to focus on 
NATO's future."IOO In August 1993, Yeltsin stated "in Warsaw that Eastern European 
countries were free to join any alliance they deemed necessary."IOI However, he 
immediately reversed his position on NATO enlargement and began "trying desperately 
to prevent enlargement."lo2 Yeltsin'wrote letters to the leaders of NATO countries that 
reflected the growing fear among Russia's political class that enlarging NATO to Central 
and Eastern Europe would lead to Russian isolation. 
1. The Resistance Qfthe Russian Elites To NATO Enlargement 
By late 1993, three principal groups among the political and military 
establishments and the bureaucracy, in Russia were deeply suspicious of NATO 
enlargement; (a) the traditionalists, (b) the radical pro-Western democrats, and (c) the 
statist democrats. 
a. The Traditionalists 
The traditionalists - including top government officials, key military 
figures, influential members of the Yeltsin administration and of the 
Security Council - perceived the future enlargement as a political move 
against Russia. They thought it would subvert Russia's security, isolate it 
in Europe and result in the West taking over its former sphere of influence 
99 Ibid., 125. 
100 Ibid., 126, 
101 Ibid" 127. 
102 Ibid. 
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in Central and Eastern Europe, creating additional grounds for the 
American dominance in the post-Cold War world. 103 
h. The Radical Pro-Western Democrats 
The ... radical pro-Western democrats viewed NATO enlargement not in 
terms of a new danger for Russia, but as a way to eliminate it from the 
"civilized world." They were hurt by the fact that Russia had moved 
decisively towards the West, but in return, the West decided not to 
embrace Russia, but to strengthen NATO. Some, like Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev, felt personally endangered, for they were accused by the 
conservatives of playing into the West's hands. l04 
c. The Statist Democrats 
Finally, statist democrats (e.g., those who stand for political democracy 
and a strong Russian state capable of defending its national interests) both 
within and without the administration, stressed that NATO's enlargement, 
while not representing a direct danger for Russia, created conditions for its 
isolation and changed the geopolitical configuration of Europe in an 
unfavorable way to Russia. They thought that enlargement would have 
negative domestic repercussions, contribute to the strengthening of the 
communists and ultra-nationalists, help the rise of anti-Western feeling, 
and offer new arguments to the communist-nationalist opposition against 
any sort of partnership with the West, 105 
2. The Military, Foreign Ministry and the Duma 
At the present time, the Russian military is concerned mainly about whether 
''NATO expansion will upset the balance of conventional forces betWeen NATO and 
Russia well beyond,,106 the imbalance that became obvious when the Warsaw Pact was 
dissolved in 1991. In 1995, the view of the Russian General Staff was "that NATO 
103 Ibid., 128 .. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Angelakis, 1997,2. 
36 
expansion would threaten the Conventional [Armed] Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.,,107 
Specific concerns of the Russian General Staff were that NATO tactical aircraft would 
"be able to strike deep into Russian territory and that the Russian Baltic fleet would be 
threatened by NATO air power moving to the shores of the Baltic Sea." The Russian 
General Staff argued that the aircraft would therefore become strategic rather than tactical 
assets, thus violating the spirit of the CFE treaty.108 The Russian General Staff is not 
expecting any attack from NATO at the present time, but stresses that its planning must 
be based on being able to react to a potentially hostile NATO acting in as yet unforeseen 
circumstances. As a compensatory move, the Russians have abandoned the 1982 Soviet 
"no first use" pledge of nuclear weapons. These concerns have also slowed down the 
process of ratification ofthe second strategic arms reduction treaty, START 11.109 START 
II was signed in January 1993, but has not yet been ratified by Russia. 
Russian policy has as its overall long-term goal preventing "NATO's military 
infrastructure fr.pm moving closer to Russia's borders."l1o NATO thus needs to take into 
account the objections of the Russian military; otherwise, Russian military officers have 
argued, ''NATO expansion may not improve European security.,,111 
In the Russian Foreign Ministry, from 1990 to 1996 NATO expansion was not 
viewed as a military threat, although it was felt to be a catalyst for negative domestic 
107 Ibid. 
108 Colonel General Viktor Barynkin, cited in ibid., 3. 
109 Ibid., 4. 
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political reaction. Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister during most of that period, 
concentrated on "making Russia a part of the 'system of Western states,',,1l2 a system of 
pluralistic democracies with their governments reined in by legal institutions, effectively 
removing the problem of military aggressiveness. He failed to convince other Russian 
leaders of the validity of his policy, and he lost his job to Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov, 
whose distrust of NATO enlargement was based on the Alliance's military potential, 
changed the focus in the Foreign Ministry from domestic reforms to military issues, and 
set up closer "cooperation and coordination between the Foreign and Defense 
ministries.,,1l3 As early as 1995, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry had begun to 
seek a compromise solution iil· the form of a "formal permanent consultation 
mechanism.,,114 In Paris, on 27 May 1997, the NATO Allies and Russia signed the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act. 
In the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), the response to NATO 
expansion has ranged across the political spectrum. With respect to three principal 
groups in the Duma, namely (1) the International Affairs Committee, (2) the Defense 
Committee, and (3) a recently formed group called the Anti-NATO Group, the responses 
range from the non-confrontational to threats of START II non-ratification. Suggestions 
from the International Affairs Committee have included creating alternatives to NATO 
expansion such as WEU expansion, the OSCE being given expanded authority, and 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., 6. 
114 Ibid., 7. 
38 
assigning the Council of Europe responsibilities to deal with internal security matters 
such as terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. 115 
The Defense Committee of the Duma pressed President Yeltsin to ask President 
Clinton at the Helsinki Summit in March 1997 to accept the following five suggestions: 116 
1) expansion should occur slowly and with promises not to station troops and nuclear 
weapons on the new members' territory; 2) expansion should be parallel to enhancing 
relations between NATO and Russia in order to prevent a Russian sense of isolation; 3) 
expansion should occur at the same time as NATO is transformed from a collective 
defense pact to a peacekeeping organization; 4) NATO must cooperate more fully with 
the OSCE and the UN; and 5) the CFE treaty must be revised to reduce NATO 
superiority. Suggestions three and four were emphasized by the Russians. 
The third group in the Duma, the Anti-NATO Group formed in January 1997, has 
"focused on "reviewing agreements on conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, 
restoring medium range missiles, and promoting closer ties with India, China and 
others.,,1l7 However, the Anti-NATO group is considered more a lobby or public 
relations mechanism than a potent force in policy recommendations. I 18 
Meanwhile, in the West debate has raged for some time about the possible effect 
NATO enlargement might have on Russia, and about how the United States and NATO 
ought to respond to the challenge" of dealing effectively with this new situation. It has 
115 Ibid., 8. 
116 Ibid., 9. 
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118 Ibid., 10. 
39 
been clear to Western leaders that the principle of open-endedness in NATO membership 
is not adequate to the task of dealing with Russia. Indeed, as David Yost points out, 
From a European perspective, it would have been wiser not to have 
brought up the issue at all - to have avoided raising long-term 
hypothetical options or posing unanswerable questions. Some Western 
experts in Russian affairs have suggested that at least some prominent 
Russians regard U.S. statements about eventual Russian membership in 
NATO as patronizing and disingenous. It is inconceivable to these 
Russians that the Western nations would agree either to defend Russia 
against China (or other powers) or to tum a functioning Alliance, a 
mainstay of the U.S. and Western global power position, into a vacuous 
collective security institution. In,this Russian view, U.S. talk of future 
NATO membership for Russia is analogous to President Reagan's promise 
to share the Strategic Defense Initiative ('Star Wars') technology with the 
Soviet Union - a promise that probably was never taken seriously by the 
Soviets. 119 
The problem of Russia is a unique one and recommendations were accordingly 
, made for addressing the unique relationship between NATO and Russia. 120 As a way of 
dealing with Russian sensitivities, a special consultative body was created, called the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, on the basis of the NATO-Russian Founding 
Act, signed in Pans on 27 May 1997. 
3. Russian Concerns about NATO Nuclear Weapons 
New tensions may arise between Russia and NATO regarding nuclear weapons. 
The new Russian Prime Minister, Evgeny Primakov, who is reportedly pragmatic enough 
to bring some interim stability to the Russian domestic situation, is also viewed as 
markedly hostile to NATO expansion and to United States interests around the globe.
121 
119 Yost, 1998, 150. 
120 Morrison, 1995, 129. 
121 Jeff Jacoby, "With Primakov, It's Back to the Cold War," Boston Globe, 17 September 1998,23. 
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Primakov has been characterized by some observers as a positive and pragmatic 
individual,122 but conversely as a supporter of terrorist activities who is likely to expend 
great amounts of energy in plotting to subvert American interests around the globe.123 
His long-term association with the KGB has provided him the skills required of a leader 
who must behave in a fairly conventional way as the representative of his country, which 
has ties with the global economic and diplomatic institutions. Any efforts by Primakov 
to pursue covert subversion of NATO and of the American strategic posture generally 
will probably be detected by the surveillance of the NATO allies. The implications for 
the strategic situation in the world include the prospect of new tensions, with a danger of 
the resumption of the nuclear arms race. 
C. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO NATO EXPANSION 
Suggestions for alternative security arrangements have included the Russian 
suggestion "to put more stres~ on the Organization on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe [OSCE].,,124 The OSCE was promoted and praised throughout Russia125 and 
much of Europe in the early 1990S126 as an instrument of crisis prevention. "Most 
Russian elites support establishing an OSCE Security Council and expanding the role of 
the OSCE as the basis for a new pan-European security system, including Canada and the 
U.S." In addition, they support the transformation of NATO "from a military alliance 
122 Georgie Anne Geyer, "Cause for concern over Primakov," Washington Times, 15 September 1998, 15. 
123 Jacoby, 17 September 1998, 23. 
124 Pushkov, 1997, 138. 
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126 Gerd Koslowski, "Bosnia: Failure of the Institutions and the Balance of Power in Europe," 
AussenPolitik, German Foreign Affairs Review, April 1996, 359. 
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into a peacekeeping/making organization.,,127 However, the OSCE failed to meet the test 
of crisis prevention in Yugoslavia. 128 "Because the OSCE is 'a fairly toothless 
organization' and depends on a consensus of 53 countries, those who have supported a 
central role for it have also called for the establishment of an OSCE Security Council, 
similar to that of the UN. Furthermore, NATO would become just one tool at the 
disposal of the OSCE, and would need to be fundamentally transformed from a military 
alliance into a peacekeeeping/making organization operating 'under the mandate of the 
UN Security Council and the OSCE. ",129 
NATO offered the Partnership for Peace (PiP) as an alternative to immediate 
NATO enlargement, and for other purposes,' in 1994. However, opposition groups in 
Moscow saw the PiP as a "hoax and smoke-screen for NATO's preparations for 
enlargement at Russia's expense."J30 Some cooperation with Russia in PiP has been 
Undertaken, principally for civil emergency activities. 131 
European Union (EU) membership extended to Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) has been suggested as an alternative method for achieving European 
security through the subtle means of "providing support for their growing economic, 
social and political structures."J32 Well-qualified American observers and scholars such 
as Zbigniew Brzezinski doubt whether this would be an effective solution, pointing out 
127 Angelakis, 1997,2. 
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that while no doubt admission in the European Union (EU) for countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe is a good idea and should be pursued, it will be a time-consuming and 
cumbersome process. In any case, the United States is not a member of the EU, and 
cannot effectively direct a successful "fast-track" membership drive for these countries.133 
Similarly, it was hoped at one time that the WEU would be used as an effective 
mechanism. However, it failed to deal decisively with the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
principally because of disagreements between Germany and France about a coordinated 
1· 134 po ICy. 
D. CONCERNS OVER CHANGES IN THE NATO MISSION & 
SOLIDARITY 
Other European affairs experts have raised the issue of how Russian membership 
might change the character of NA!,O.135 More specifically, would NATO be changed 
from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization? "The 
officially expressed rationales for the NATO enlargement process in the Alliance study 
-. general aims such as promoting stabilization and democratization - offer no grounds 
for excluding Russia. Extending NATO membership to Russia, however, would mean 
emptying the Alliance of its collective defense substance. ,,136 As Henry Kissinger has 
incisively stated, "the proposition that NATO enlargement might eventually include 
Russia confuses all parties. For Russia is in, but not of, Europe; it borders Asia, Central 
133 Zbigniew Brzezinski, cited in ibid. 
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Asia, and the Middle East, and it pursues policies along these borders that are difficult to 
reconcile with NATO objectives. Russian membership would dilute the Alliance to the 
point ofirrelevance.,,137 In addition, it appears that 
[T]he European Allies generally consider U.S. rhetoric that envisages 
eventual Russian membership in NATO unwise. From their perspective, 
three arguments against Russian membership stand out: First, Russian 
membership could mean abandoning NATO's role as an instrument of 
collective defense and tuining the Alliance into an ineffective Kantian or 
Wilsonian collective security regime for the Euro-Atlantic region ... 
Second, Russian membership in NATO would upset existing patterns of 
influence in the Alliance, and might subordinate the Europeans to a U.S.-
Russian dyad or power... Third, if NATO retained its role as an 
instrument of collective defense, Russian membership would make the 
Alliance responsible for protecting Russia against China and other 
powers. 138 . 
1. The Impact of Russian Membership on NATO Solidarity 
Not all of America's European Allies consider openness toward eventual Russian 
membership in NATO as wise or prudent.139 In fact this has been a source of division in 
the Alliance.14o In 1994 the German Defense Minister, Volker Rilhe, declared that "if 
Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. It would be like 
the United Nations of Europe - it:~ouldn't work.,,141 William Perry, then U.S. Secretary 
of Defense, took a different view and stated that Russian inclusion was not ruled out. 142 
President Clinton said in March 1997 that' his vision of the future included a special 
137 Kissinger, cited in ibid. 
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relationship with Russia, and did not rule out even Russian membership in a common 
. 11· 143 secunty a lance. 
2. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council 
Owing in part to its wish to make NATO enlargement more palatable to the 
Russians, NATO has created a consultative mechanism which - some observers argue 
- may create serious problems. Henry Kissinger raised this disturbing possibility in 
October 1997. During the Senate hearings on ratification of NATO enlargement, 
Kissinger called attention to a proximity or "back·door" pressure problem that could 
amount to a de facto veto. He referred to the fact that NATO officials and representatives 
to the Alliance from Central European countries and Russia are housed in the same 
complex of buildings in Brussels. Thus, the danger is that informal pressures might be 
brought to bear on the staff of new· NATO members, who might be working on problems 
being discussed in a more formal setting, thus giving Russia a de -facto veto. In this 
context, KissiD;ger criticized the consultative machinery and philosophical ambiguities of 
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Kissinger said that he is deeply concerned 
about the Founding Act that seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by offering 
Russia a role in NATO councils. The most troublesome aspect of the Founding Act is the 
consultative machinery which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with 
existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council (PJC) composed of the same 
ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian representative. The 
Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to 
143 Clinton, cited in ibid. 
45 
meet at the foreign ministers level. The first such ministerial meeting was held at the 
United Nations in September 1997. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also 
envisaged, as well as summits. 
It has been argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO 
Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory. However, 
critics such as Kissinger have argued that it will not work in practice in all but the most 
extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical; 
each country will assess the grave of step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms 
of its overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and 
Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. 144 Kissinger further explained in 
testimony before the Senate Committee that the Russian ambassador is located inside the 
. building where the other council members are, and so are their military representatives.
145 
Further, an ironic outcome of the executive signature process is that the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act is already in effect. In contrast, the full process of NATO integration by 
the three new European members of NATO is much more time-consuming. As an 
exe~utive agreement, the NATO-Russia Founding Act does not have to be ratified by the 
U.S. Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus, if the admission of 
new members is not ratified, Kissinger argued, the Alliance will have inherited the worst 
144 Kissinger, cited in The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 87. 
145 Ibid. 
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possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered 
dysfunctional by the Founding Act. 146 However, according to David Yost, 
Kissinger's anxieties about the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council 
appear to have been disproportionate so far. The Council has convened 
for the meetings envisaged in the Founding Act, but little has been 
accomplished - partly because its procedures are quite bureaucratic, but 
mainly because the Russians have not been willing to exchange much 
information or engage in genuine dialogue, relying instead on predictable 
prepared positions. Thus the Russians have not been able to use the 
Council to influence significantly, much less interfere with, the North 
Atlantic Council's proceedings so far. 147 
Moreover, according to NATO participants "in May 1998 it was reported that the 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council had made little headway because of procedural 
confusion and Moscow's persistent distrust of an organization that it long considered its 
enemy. . . [Furthermore] at a recent meeting to exchange information on tactical nuclear 
weapons, the Russian delegation's presentation was 'extremely fuzzy' and failed to 
provide any illumination on the fate of some 10,000 to 12,000 of its tactical nuclear 
weapons.,,148 
3. Domestic Impact on Russia of NATO Enlargement 
. . 
According to the Russian commentator Alexander Pushkov, "NATO enlargement 
risks poisoning the relationship between Russia and the West for a long time.,,149 
Furthermore, he wrote, the impact on Russian civilization should not be underestimated. 
In Pushkov's view, there will be seven und,esirable consequences for Russia's national 
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mentality, foreign policy and strategic posture. These seven undesirable consequences he 
listed are as follows. ISO 
• Deepening of the gap between Russian civilization and the West. Enlarging 
NATO would undermine Russia's feeling of uniqueness and prompt it to 
assertiveness to demonstrate its uniqueness. 
• The "loose cannon effect." Russia will become more inward-looking and 
. unpredictable. 
• Russia will reassert its historic sphere of influence. 
• Ukraine and the Baltic republics are especially sensitive trigger points to 
Russian sensitivities, and inclusion of these states in NATO would result in a 
major crisis between Russia and the West. 
• NATO Enlargement will reduce Russian cooperation on treaties such as 
START II as well as the control of chemical weapons. 
• NATO enlargement will strengthen anti -Western circles -in Russia. 
• NATO enlargement will strengthen those who favor a strong military posture 
in Russia. Strong feelings of distrust towards NATO's Eastern Border will 
emerge . 
. a. The Russian Identity Crisis and Patriotic Consensus 
Some European experts have warned that Russia is experiencing a cultural 
identity crisis, because, "today's Russian Federation is a state without a concept of its 
statehood.,,151 Gerhard Simon notes that "the formation of an empire extending beyond 
the Great Russian ethnos and its areas of population, held together by the Tsarist dynasty 
and the Russian mission civilisatrice - that was the idea of [the] state of the Russian 
Federation before 1917.' The Bolsheviks opted for more far-reaching goals: the order 
149 Pushkov, 1997, 139. 
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inside the USSR was to become the model for the one world, the socialist world, of the 
future." I 52 
The identity crisis seems to result from confusion between Russian ideas 
of what constitutes statehood and their ethnic sense. Furthermore, this identity crisis has 
implications for the Russian people vis-a-vis the other ethnic groups that make up the 
Russian Federation. The absence of civil war, despite the existence of severe domestic 
turmoil in Russia, apparently rests on "patriotic consensus" - that is, on a sense of 
Russian grandeur. 
h. Geopolitics and Grandeur 
Even though the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the Russians have not. 
abandoned their ideas of grandeur. Many Russians hold that the loss of Russian status as 
a superpower is unnatural and temporary.153 The Russians are in a state of shock and 
denial about their loss of superpower status. A fallback emotional prop is their 
longstanding collective consciousness regarding their vast land and the concept of 
"geopolitics." Because Russia is a huge land-mass with vast natural resources, Russians 
still have one source of confidence.154 In the Russian language, the term geopolitics 
means that geographical determinants are not subject to historical change and that a 
country's location and size guarantee its significance and influence. Therefore, Russia's 
claim to a role as a world power is viewed as guaranteed, irrespective of its internal state 
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of affairs or economic and military performance. For example, Russian politicians such 
as Gennady Zyuganov have stated "that the goal of Russian policy should be the 
restoration of a single state on an essential new and entirely voluntary basis, whose 
frontiers should not substantially differ from those of the Soviet Union.,,155 
c. Russian Exceptionalism 
Secondly, another underlying Russian cultural premise is that Russian 
civilization is not a European civilization, but a special and unique Russian civilization. 156 
This Russian civilization has a civiiizing mission in the world, it is argued, and the rest of 
the world will benefit from the effects of the civilizing mission. This idea was clearly 
articulated by Sergei Baburin, a leading officer of Russian parliament, in 1995 when he 
said that "'the special Russian. civilization' was pervaded with the awareness of the 
community of ideas, of social-psychological, economic, political-legal unity of all the 
various strata of Russian society.,,157 Nevertheless, this uniquely Russian civilization is 
considered to be international, at least in its intellectual form. It is a magnet, as well as an 
example to other nations. It is a special "superethnos" into which other ethnic groups can 
. . 
be drawn, with the potential for thus creating a "new historic community of mankind. ,,158 
d. Changing Values 
A third concept that entails a basic change is the attitude toward the role of 
the individual in society. According to Gerhard Simon, Russian culture has been 
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antipathetic to the individualistic, liberal and rationalistic culture of the West. 
Collectivism, striving for justice and equality, patience and a willingness to endure 
suffering, and the priority of intellectual needs over material needs are described as 
national traits of the Russians. At the same time, according to Simon, concomitant with 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union (and indeed one of the reasons for it) has been the 
growing social pressure for universal human rights, the right to free development of the 
individual's personality, and, above all, the striving for individual prosperity and a 
comfortable standard of living. 159 
d. Mixed Economy 
A fourth feature is ~he co-existence of private enterprise and government 
intervention in the economy. Despite disillusionment with capitalism, specifically the 
disastrous "Mafia capitalism" rampant in the country, the Russians seem to be steering 
toward a mixed economy.l60 At the present time, the Russians do not want a return to 
communism with a command economy or the restoration of Leninism. 161 Nevertheless, 
there are persistent calls for more government intervention and planning in the economy 
combined with the existence of partial privatization; these factors seem to point in the 
future to what is usually referred to as a mixed economy. 162 
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IV. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, DECLARATORY 
POLICY, AND STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, then Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev optimistically called for "new political thinking.,,163 This 
was based on his vision of a Russia integrated into a "new world order,,,l64 and 
accordingly set on a path to improved socioeconomic and political conditions similar to 
those existing in the West. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has held essentially the same 
goals for Russia - that is - "to democratize her society; to implement reforms and 
achieve an integration of our economy into the international market economy.,,165 
Unfortunately, instead of a new Russian democracy, the result has been criminalization of 
the economy, the "collapse of discipline,,166 in the economy and in nuclear weapons 
control, as well as the concomitant development of a privatized, oligarchical, quasi-state 
governing system which rules in the areas of media, finance, and marketing. Law 
enforcement in Russia is marred by corruption and mafia-type violence, with many of the 
163 Bruce Parrot, "State-Building and Post-Soviet Military Affairs. From the Past to the Future," in State 
Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Bruce Parrot. (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 1995),276. 
164 lbid. 
165 Excerpts from a speech by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, entitled "Russia's place and role in the 
period of Multipolar World Formation," on 12 May 1998, Embassy of the Russian Federation, Press 
Release # 18, 15 May 1998,3. 
166 Henry Kissinger, "India and Pakistan: After the Explosions," Washington Post, 9 June 1998, 15. 
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functions of the police taken over by private armies, privately owned security forces, and 
'1' 167 parruTIl Itary groups. 
In November 1993, Russian military doctrine abandoned the Soviet-era pledge of 
the no-first-use of nuclear weapons, a shift in position based not on strength but on 
weakness, especially of the Russian conventional forces. Military reform decrees have 
been made but actual reform has eluded the reformers. 168 Mismanagement has evidently 
occurred in the areas of strategic and non-strategic arms control as well as in nuclear 
weapons stewardship.169 These failures have been in the larger context of the Russian 
failure to build "a coherent and effective decision-making process.,,170 The essential 
infrastructure of state-building ano strategic planning has been "marked by improvisation 
d 171 and a hoc" responses. 
B. CONVENTIONAL FORCE WEAKNESS AND THE STRATEGY OF 
INCREASED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR FORCES 
The breakup of the Soviet Union coupled with severe economic chaos and 
mismanagement has resulted in a great weakening of the Russian military's conventional 
force strength. Russian military power has become a function of the social, economic and 
political chaos in the country. Rapid change, economic problems, socioeconomic 
167 Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal, Russia's New Mafia, (New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1995), 286. 
168 Stephen J. Blank, "Russia's Armed Forces on the Brink of Reform," Strategic Studies Institute 
Monograph, 16 March 1998,1. . 
169 Congress, Senate, Committee on Strategic Forces Subcommitee of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on Nuclear Policy, Bruce Blair, Testimony during hearings 31 March 1998, Unpaged, Nexis, 
Online. 
170 Stephen F. Larrabee, and Theodore W. Karasik, Foreign and Security Decisionmaking under Yeltsin, 
(Santa Monica and Washington D.C.: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 1997), iii. 
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pressures, obsolescence, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and various treaties have also 
combined to reduce the size ofthe Russian strategic nuclear capabilities. 
Because of conventional force weakness, the Russians in November 1993 
abandoned the 1982 Soviet pledge of "no first use," and at the present time Russian 
dependence on nuclear deterrence is their stated first line of defense, even in the case of a 
conventional attack.172 In 1996, the war in Chechnya ended in a Russian defeat. This 
demonstrated the weakness of the Russian conventional military for the entire world to 
see, with the psychological effect of increasing even further Russian emotional 
dependence on their nuclear defense. 173 
The Russian Security Council in repudiating "no-first-use" revived the concept of 
"limited nuc1earwar." It also approved a new military doctrine that has been described as 
"more destabilizing - and more dangerous - than Soviet Cold War military 
doctrine." 174 
The development of this policy came about when the military supported President 
Y eltsin in resisting the October 1993 coup attempt. This resulted in his being forced to 
yield to military demands for a tougher stance against the West. The Russian military 
172 Roy Allison, "The Russian Anned Forces: Structures, Roles and Policies," in Russia and Europe. The 
Emerging Security Agenda, ed. Vladamir Baranovsky. (Stockholm, Sipri, Oxford University Press, 1997), 
183. 
173 Peter Vincent Pry, "War Scare: Nuclear Countdown After The Soviet Fall," 1997, unpublished 
manuscript used with permission of the author, 185. 
174 Ibid., 171. 
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adopted the new policy as a way of making up for the lack of conventional forces through 
1· 1 175 greater re lance on nuc ear weapons. 
The policy document approved in November 1993 is entitled Basic Provisions of 
the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 176 This policy has been described as 
dangerous, not only because the new doctrine allows Russia to undertake a preemptive 
nuclear attack if Russia suffers conventional attacks, but also because the list of what the 
Russians would consider provocation has been lengthened. l77 Therefore, according to 
General Maklunut Gareyev, Russia may launch a nuclear first strike to "preempt enemy 
preparations for such an attack," and further, "might start a nuclear war based on vague 
strategic warning or 'totally unproved aggressive intentions' attributed by Russia t6 
another state.,,178 Consequently, some analysts have suggested, Russia may resort to 
preemptive nuclear attack based on vague, unverified information, a circumstance which 
considerably lowers the nuclear threshold. 179 The Russians have stipulated that any use 
on their part of nuclear weapons would be defensive: 
The Russian Federation: will not employ its nuclear weapons against any 
state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
dated 1 July 1968, which does not possess nuclear weapons except in the 
cases of: (a) an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, 
Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies by any state which is connected 
by an alliance agreement with a state that does possess nuclear weapons; 
(b) joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in 
the carrying out or in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the 
175 Alexei Arbatov, "Russian Military Doctrine and Strategic Nuclear Forces to the Year 2000 and 
Beyond," a paper presented at a conference in Monterey, California, 23-29 March 1997, 3. 
176 Pry, 1997, 171. . 
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Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its 
allies. 180 
The diplomatic wording of the Basic Provisions states: "The aim of the Russian 
Federation's policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear 
war by deterring the launching of aggression against the Russian Federation and its 
allies." According to some Russian observers, the document shqws "a readiness to lower 
the nuclear threshold to the maximum extent.,,181 In the words of Pavel Grachev, in a 
statement published in 1993, when he was Mihister of Defense: ."If an adversary has 
launched an aggression, we have the right to choose and employ those types, forms and 
ways of military actions that are most effective in a given situation. These may be both 
offensive and defensive in nature.,,182 
Subsequently, in 1997 the ~ead of the Russian Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, 
emphasized to the Russian press that Russia has the right to first use of nuclear weapons 
if Russia is attacked by conventional weapons, or to "discourage military adventurers 
bc:nt on exploiting Russia's difficulties." Moreover, Rybkin was unequivocal in declaring 
that Russia would respond with nuclear weapons, if necessary, to "a direct military 
challenge. ,,183 
180 Ibid., 170-171. 
181 Sergey Rogev, cited in ibid., 172. 
182 Pavel S. Grachev, "Drafting a New Russian Military Doctrine: Guidelines for the establishment of the 
Russian Armed Forces," Military Technology, February 1993, 10. 
183 Rybkin, cited in Amy F. Woolf, and Kara Wilson, "Russia's Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force 
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Criticisms of the Russian first use doctrine include the argument that this policy is 
transparently a case of posturing, i.e., "a political message to the West, lacking any 
material substance or logical framework.,,184 Confusion in the strategic thinking behind 
these changes stems from not only the "nature of the deterrent relationship between East 
and West,,,185 but also from the entire rationale behind the doctrine. It has been claimed 
that President Y eltsin acceded to the military doctrine in 1993 as a tradeoff in exchange 
for Defense Ministry support in his struggles with the Russian parliament, and that the 
military doctrine does not represent a plan devised by the Russian Security Council. 186 
The validity of the doctrine as well as its practical val:ue has been called into 
question. 18? Alexei Arbatov has argued that the first use of nuclear weapons would be 
nonsensical and in fact suicidal for Russia, because Russia "would not be able to achieve 
any military advantage by initiating nuclear warfare, either to dominate in escalation or 
inflict larger damage than incurred by itself. Moreover, in a crisis situation, Russia's first 
use posture might provoke a preemptive strike by NATO, which would be. quite effective 
due to its conventional, tactical and strategic nuclear counterforce· superiority. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Roy Allison, 1997~ 183 
186 Ibid., 179. 
187 In Alexei Arbatov's view, the doctrine of relying on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional 
force weakness makes no sense in Russia's situation, because Russia is unlikely to encounter an enemy that 
meets the criteria of the two basic assumptions underlying the usefulness of the doctrine. These two 
assumptions are (1) "an opponent or opponents superior in conventional capabilities and capable of 
threatening one's own interests by implementing successful conventional offensive operations," and (2) 
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Contemplating this possibility, Russia might decide to launch its weapons first, with 
catastrophic consequences for itself as well as for others.,,188 The lack of a rational plan 
for tactical nuclear weapons management and use is a serious aspect of the chaotic 
Russian military situation. However, this is apparently one of the longstanding 
"peculiarities of SovietlRussian strategic nuclear thinking.,,189 For example, "declaratory 
doctrine lives quite independently from practical strategy and forces. And as before, 
several principal strike plans are operational without much attention to their validity at 
the level of 'grand strategy' or national survival.,,19o Alexei Arbatov has pointed out other 
features of Russian strategic thinking regarding nuclear weapons: 
In particular, nuclear weapons employment strategy (i.e., first/second 
strike counterforce/countervalue targeting, retaliation/damage limitation 
missions etc.) is not seen as closely related to force levels, structure, 
posture and systems characteristics. Force employment plans are not 
perceived as affecting the probability of war, encouraging or provoking 
first nuclear strike/use from one or the other opponent. Any declaration on 
the need to compensate Russian conventional weakness with nuclear 
strength is predominantly a general political argument, not a reflection of a 
consistent strategic analysis, assessment of contingencies or planning of 
d c. 1· . 191 elense po ICY optIOns. 
According to Arbatov, the ,ongoing processes in Russian strategic posture are 
affected by "(1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its nuclear arms 
development/production complex; (2) the deep economic and financial crisis in Russia, as 
a result of the failed 'reforms' of 1992-1996; and (3) disarray in Moscow's decision-
188 Ibid., 4-5. 




making system on strategic programs and anus control talks, which has led to confused 
priorities in defense policy and a wide divergence between force planning, budgeting and 
anus control agreements."I92 
In early August 1998, the Russians issued "The Foundations (Concept) of the 
State Policy on Military Development for the Period Until 2005," a document which is 
said to be a precursor to an updated version of "The Military Doctrine of Russia." This 
updated version has not yet appeared, but is reportedly due some time in the autumn of 
1998, and will replace the November 1993 military doctrine. 193 Reports from Andrei 
Kokoshin, then Secretary of the Security Council, announced that the first two features of 
the "Foundations" are that it holds that "Russia's nuclear capabilities reduce the risk of 
general war, and [it] identifies local wars as the most immediate threat to Russian 
security.,,194 In other words, "the m~{n dangers to Russia's security [are] identified by the 
document as small-scale conflicts along the country's perimeter.,,195 The new defense 
concept contains the two previous basic assumptions: namely, that local wars could 
escalate into global ones, and that Russia may have to use nuclear weapons first in its 
defense, assumptions which do not represent any basic departure from the premise of the 
November 1993 doctrine. 
192 Ibid., 8. 
193 For more background see "Kremlin Approves Major Defense Policy Document," Jamestown 
Foundation Monitor, 4 August 1998, 61. 
194 Ibid. 
195 For more background see the Jamestown Foundation Monitor-a daily briefing on the Post Soviet States, 
4 August 1998. Available at [http: www.jamestown.org.]; accessed 6 September 1998. 
60 
Reports of incidents of Russia's "overdeveloped threat sensitivity"l96 include 
those arising from domestic turbulence that could easily disturb equilibrium in Russia's 
military stance. According to Peter pry,197 "The desperation and paranoia of the Russian 
General Staff will only deepen as Russia continues to weaken militarily and internally, 
perhaps crumbling toward anarchy and civil war. The tempo of crisis in Russia and the 
former Soviet Union - and the threat to global security - seem to be increasing, as 
reflected by the occurrence in the 1990s of nuclear 'close calls.",198 The threat of a 
nuclear war scare arising out of domestic turmoil in a battle for succession to President 
Y eltsin has been moderated with the rise of Yevgeny Primakov to the position of prime 
minister; thus he is the most likely successor to President Yeltsin. However, a war scare· 
might arise out of a coup attempt. In the case of the Norwegian rocket launched on 25 
January 1995, it was apparently a failure of the -communications within the -Russian 
bureaucracy that resulted in a dangerous misperception of nuclear attack. In other words, 
normally Norw~y would inform the Russian government of any planned rocket tests by 
196 Pry, 1997, 169. 
197 Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and ,currently 
serves as a Professional Staff Member to the National Security Committee of the U.S. House of 
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purposes. However, Turner Books went out of business after the Turnerffime Warner merger, and 
unfortunately, dropped its entire pending book publication list. Peter Pry's manuscript "War Scare" (cited 
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way of an official letter sent by mail. However, this time the letter got lost in the Russian 
bureaucracy. 199 
Russia's "overdeveloped threat sensitivity,,20o has led some observers to point out 
that the United States and NATO should be more aware of the fact that Western "security 
policies, military operations and exercises" tend to unsettle the Russian military with 
possibly dangerous consequences.201 As Bruce Blair has observed, the Russian defense 
establishment is "more suspicious of the West than most observers imagine.,,202 
According to Blair, the Russian military has a susceptibility to "fear and panic,,203 which 
could affect its judgment in the decision-making process. This circumstance has 
implications for an accidental or mistaken launch of nuclear weapons. 
There are reports that the Russians are still very sensitive to NATO military 
exercises, including those such as the 1983 NATO theater nuclear exercise ABLE 
ARCHER -83 that resulted in a Russian nuclear alert. Another war scare occurred in early 
1996 when NATO exercises in Norway, called BATTLE GRIFFIN-96, led to Russian 
uneasiness and to Russia's military forces being put on alert.204 Russian nuclear alerts are 
increasing in frequency, with "war scares" occurring since 1991 approximately every 
eighteen months to two years.205 Most recently Russia has threatened to stop cooperating 
199 David Hoffman, "Shattered Shield: Decline of Russia's Nuolear Forces; Doctrines of the Cold War 
Refuse to Die," Washington Post, 15 March 1998,3. 
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with NATO. In October 1998, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov told Russia's 
Federation Council that he had told the Western Allies that, in the event of NATO air 
strikes against Serbia, he would "sharply change our attitude to NATO and reconsider our 
orientation.,,206 Primakov sees the Balkans as a Russian area of influence, and in order to 
keep Belgrade from being bombed by NATO, he has threatened to end cooperation with 
NATO.207 
C. RUSSIA'S GEOPOLITICAL STANCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The Russian elites continue to suspect that the West has motives focusing on 
Russia's encirclement, and that the West would like to take .advantage of the country's 
current weakness. For example, ~ome Russians fear that NATO peacekeeping efforts in 
Bosnia are actually part of a hidden agenda to "permanently introduce a large Western 
military presence that could use the region as a staging base to threaten Russia.,,208 
"Similarly, in February 1991, during the Gulf War, the Russians "assumed the United 
States was on the verge of launching a nuclear first strike on Iraq.,,209 Significantly, 
"Russian press reports speculated that the impending U.S. strike against Iraq was part of a 
master plan to subvert Russian interests and dominate the world.,,210 These responses 
reflect the longstanding Russian tendency to see the country as surrounded, and to believe 
206 European Stars and Stripes press release, 15 October 1998. 
207 Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Sees NATO Raids as Imperiling Ties to West," New York Times, 13 
October 1998, A6. 
208 Pry, 1997, 177. 
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that the West wishes to "invade, surround, or encourage the breakup ofRussia.,,211 It is a 
feature of Russian military thinking that local wars on Russia's borders could escalate 
into global nuclear war. "The mechanism, as implied in Russian writings, that escalates a 
local conflict into a nuclear war appears to be intervention of the United States or of U.S. 
allies into conflicts on Russia's periphery. From such a vantage point, the West could 
then invade, surround, or encourage the breakup of Russia. Because of the superiority of 
Western conventional forces and resources, Russian military efforts to prevent these 
developments would mean recourse to nuclear weapons.,,212 
With the ascendancy of Yevgeny Primakov to the position of prime minister in 
September 1998, it is likely that the attitude of the Russian government toward NATO. 
and the United States will become both overtly and covertly more difficult, with a "bitter 
revival of anti-American hostility.,,213 Primakov is a leader whose "aim in life is to 
contain and thus defeat American leadership.,,214 Primakov has repeatedly taken the 
position that ~~ssia is a "wounded great power in an open-ended struggle with the 
West.,,215 Primakov's background is with the international section of the former KGB, an 
organization now called the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Primakov served as 
Russia's foreign minister from January 1996 through August 1998. Primakov as foreign 
minister was able to work together with NATO to formulate the NATO-Russia Founding 
2ll Ibid., 177. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Jacoby, 17 September 1998,23. 
214 Arnold Beichman, "A Lethal Soviet Alliance," Washington Times, 21 October 1998, 17. 
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Act, and he was the principal Russian official with whom NATO dealt in setting up 
NATO-Russia cooperation with IFOR and SFOR in Yugoslavia. He is proficient in 
Arabic and has provided diplomatic support for rogue state regimes in the Middle East 
and North Africa.216 As Russian foreign minister Primakov was a strong supporter of 
Russia's geopolitical interests. During Primakov's time as Russian foreign minister, one 
goal of the Yeltsin government was stated to be "satisfying a significant part of the 
population who believe Moscow must resume its duties as a global superpower, at least in 
the military sense, even if this means goi~g against what is preferred by the West.,,217 
Furthermore, "Signals related to Moscow's ties with states of the [former] Soviet empire 
and the eastward expansion of NATO are inter-linked. The ultimate goal is to prevent 'a 
NATO presence on the physical boundaries of Russia. As such, the emphasis is to stop 
the expansion of NATO or to slow it doWn considerably. In the worst scenario, Moscow 
would seek a 'weak expansion, ~ not involving military or strategic arrangements between 
former Soviet bloc states and NATO. To accomplish its objectives, Moscow would 
resort to threats ifnecessary.,,218 
Some insight into the directions future Russian geopolitical strategy might take 
appear in the report issued in October 1995 by INOBIS, the Russian Institute of Defense 
Studies. The INOBIS report is entitled "Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for 
216 Michael J. Waller, "Career KGB man becomes Russian Premier; Primakov was architect of Soviet 
support support for terrorism," Russian Reform Monitor, 14 September 1998, l. 
217 "Russia, - Emphasizing Russian Interests," Arab Press Service Organization press release lAC (SM) 
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Countering the Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security.,,219 
According to the author of the INOBIS report, Anton Surikov: 
Finally, in case of a total break in relations with the United States, Russia 
has such convincing arguments for it as the nuclear-missile potential and 
the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the 
world, which with skillful tactics can play the role of a kind of trading 
card. And in case Russia is persistently driven into a comer, then it will be 
possible to undertake to sell military nuclear and missile technologies to 
such countries as Iran and Iraq, and to Algeria after Islamic forces arrive in 
power there. Moreover, Russia's direct military alliance with some of the 
countries mentioned also should not be excluded, above all with Iran, 
withiri the· framework of which a Russian troop contingent and tactical 
nuclear weapons could be stationed on the shores of the Persian Gulf and 
the Strait ofHormuz.22o 
According to Peter Pry, "Russian press reports claim the INOBIS plan was tentively 
approved by the Defense Ministry. INOBIS analyst Anton Surikov, in an April 1997 
article, claims the expansion of NATO to the Baltic States would constitute a provocation 
as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation.,,221 
In 1997 and again in 1998, Pry met with "a high-ranking Russian official." 
According to Pry, this official "warned me that NATO enlargement could trigger a 
nuclear war. The Russian official claimed knowledge of military contingency plans to 
deal with certain scenarios of NATO expansion.,,222 Significantly, the high-ranking 
~ussian official told Pry that 
NATO enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia would be reluctantly accepted by Russia, 
219 V:M. Surikov, "Conceptual Provisions of a Strategy for Countering the Main External Threats to 
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220 Ibid. 
221 Pry, 1997,246 
222 Ibid., 247. 
66 
and not trigger a military response, providing tactical nuclear weapons or 
advanced conventional weapons and strike platfroms are not forward 
deployed to these states. If NATO moves tactical nuclear weapons or 
advanced conventional into these states, according to the Russian official, 
Russia would respond militarily to these countermeasures - deploying 
Russian tactical nuclear weapons, returning Russian missile submarines to 
Cuba, moving Russian nuclear weapons into North Korea to threaten U.S. 
troops and allies, or basing Russian nuclear weapons in Iran to threaten the 
Strait of Hormuz and the global oil supply, for example. Or, the official 
said, Russia might 'initiate a preventive nuclear war.,223 
Ominously for NATO, Russian defense officials announced in Moscow in early 
October 1998 that "Russia is prepared to sell several up-to-date air-defense systems, 
including the SAM-300 (SA-lO 'Grumble') system to Belgrade.,,224 Russian Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeyev was in Belgrade during the first week of October 1998 to provide 
support and advice to the Serbian military. Of great concern is the possible sale .to Serbia 
of the S-300 PMU2 missile which contains an advanced design called a "transverse 
guidance engine, which reduces the chances of missing the target when the missile begins 
to home in.,,225 Such support for the Serbs is likely to have a deleterious .effect on 
continued NATO-Russia cooperation in the former Yugoslavia. 
D. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR· WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND MILITARY 
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
According. to French sources, the ~ussian military currently has a stockpile of 
between 10,000 and 30,000 tactical nuclear weapons.226 On 6 October 1998, Yuri 
223 Ibid., 248. 
224 Nicolay Novichkov, "Russia Strains Relations in Belgrade Missil~ Sale," Jane's Defense Weekly, 14 
October 1998, 19. 
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Maslyukov, the Deputy Prime Minister, stated that the nuclear weapons stockpile has 
become obsolete, and he urged parliamentary support for' President Boris Yeltsin's 
recommendation for building the new Topol missiles.227 The decision after a July 1998 
military review was that Russia's land-based missile force can afford only one new type 
of missile, the Topol (SS-27). However, the missiles are unlikely to be deployed this 
year because testing led to an explosion on the launch pad on 23 October 1998.228 
President Yeltsin has called for several new Yuri Dolgoruky nuclear submarines to be 
equipped with nuclear missiles; however, the failure of the missiles to perform properly 
during testing has led to a shut down of their construction.229 Even in the area of design 
in nuclear weapons, there has been a breakdown in the system, including the elite 
Arzamas-16 (Sarov) laboratory.23o 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that Russia continues to spend money designing, 
manufacturing and marketing ~eapons, in particular the "latest versions of surface-to-air 
missiles designed for use with its S-300PMU Favorit air defense system.,,231 Two new 
missile systems, the S-300PMU-2 and S-300PMU-3, were displayed at a weapons show 
in Greece in October 1998.232 Russia is surprisingly strong in revolutionary new 
technologies and "maintains islands of excellence. Deep-diving submarines like the 
227 Robin Lodge, "Russia cannot afford to keep nuclear arsenal," London Times, 7 October 1998. 
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modified alpha class, beam weapons, and extremely high and fast-flying aircraft" are 
areas of Russian strength.233 In the nuclear area, Russia has helped Iran to build a nuclear 
power plant at Bushehr, located approximately 470 miles south of Tehran. 
In addition, work at the huge underground bunker at Yamentau Mountain in the 
Beloretsk area of the Southern Urals continues. See map of the Russian Federation in the 
Appendix. This mega-project began in the 1970s when President Leonid Brezhnev was 
heading the USSR. The giant endeavor is reportedly an underground shelter for Russia's 
government in the event of a nuclear attack. 234 It has also been described "as a mine, an 
underground food warehouse, an ore-processing complex and a nuclear waste dump.,,235 . 
Furthermore, it has also been suspected to be the site of the so-called "Dead Hand" -
that is, an "automatic system for delivering a retaliatory strike when the top political 
leadership and the General Staff ~e already d.estroyed or deprived of communications 
equipment as a result of an enemy attack.,,236 
Other deep underground bunkers are being built as well, to enable Russian leaders 
to flee from Moscow and, more generally, to escape from nuclear attacks. Extensive 
tunp.els are said to be under construction, as well as a secret underground railway line. 
There is a bunker nearly complete forty-six miles south of Moscow at Voronovo, and 
232 Ibid. 
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another at Sharapovo, thirty-four miles away from Moscow. Furthermore, four additional 
complexes of bunkers are built inside the city ofMoscow.
237 
E. STEWARDSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Conventional force weakness and reliance on nuclear weapons are likely to 
continue. Russia cannot hope to address its conventional force shortcomings adequately 
at any time in the near future because of severe economic constraints.238 Despite 
pronouncements by Russian military planners, Russia's readiness and military 
professional standards have continued to deteriorate from that of a first rate power to a 
third, fourth or fifth rate power.239 Worse still, they could become "a major threat to 
Russia's own internal security and stability.,,240 There are reports that the "chains of 
command are broken and split into rival factions. There is no rule of law, [no] systematic 
or regularized procedure for making and implementing policy decisions, nor any 
accountability to the Duma or the Judiciary.,,241 
The Russian military is angry and tensions are at a high level. On 14 September 
1998, retired General Alexander Lebed, now the governor of Krasnoyarsk,. warned that 
the situation in Russia's military is so serious that he fears there could be a military coup; 
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in his view, the armed forces are at a "breaking point.,,242 Reportedly some units are 
facing the prospect of only two meals a day; and others have no access to food for the 
coming winter, having already eaten eighty percent of the food kept on hand for war 
supplies. Some military units have been advised to fish, hunt and gather wild foods in 
order to survive.243 
Furthermore, the Russian army is reportedly desperate for conscript personnel. 
According to Defense Ministry officials, draft dodging is at the rate of about 30,000 men 
per year. This is so serious a problem that drastic measures have included resorting to 
military press-ganging in order to get the recruits.244 Military service in Russia is a 
humiliating, degrading and dangerous experience, with serious morale deterioration and 
high rates of suicide and murder among recruits. 
Incidents of violence and killing among Russian soldiers guarding sensitive 
nuclear facilities are on the rise.245 In fact, . there have been so many incidents that 
President Boris Yeltsin on 21 October 1998, ordered an inspection of security procedures. 
Specifically, one incident was a shooting spree by an army sergeant at Mayak, part of the 
Beliabinsk nuclear complex, on 20 September 1998. Another incident occurred on 5 
September 1998, with hostage-taking, shooting, and a hijacking attempt at Novaya 
Zemlya, Russia's leading nuclear testing facility. A third incident happened on 11 
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September 1998, when a sailor went berserk aboard an Akula-class nuclear-attack 
submarine. 246 
There are conflicting reports about the safety of Russian stewardship of nuclear 
weapons. Officially, the government declares that security is good.247 In Russia, both 
military and civilian units participate in the handling of nuclear weapons. In the Russian 
military, it is the Twelfth Main Directorate, a highly professional branch of the Defense 
Ministry, which is charged with the control and safe handling of nuclear weapons. There 
has been some consolidation, coordination, and streamlining of the command structure 
associated with security of nuclear weapons. On 1 April 1998, General Valynkin, 
commander of the Twelfth Main Directorate on the general staff, also took over 
responsibility for all Russian naval nuclear operations. On 1 May 1998, he took over 
. responsibility for all Russian air force nuclear weapons. His projected that before the end 
of 1998, General Valynkin will also take control of all the Strategic Rocket Force nuclear 
248 
weapons. 
Despite these efforts at the practical operational level, Russian hypersensitivity 
and breakdowns in the Russian infrastructure have meant some close brushes with 
nuclear catastrophe. For example, the Black Brant II incident in Norway in January 1995 
resulted in a "near miss" nuclear launch by the Russians. The Russian Navy had for 
several months prior to the launching of the Norwegian missile perceived an increased 
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threat from "allegedly increased U.S. submarine patrols in the Norwegian and Barents 
seas, even penetrating Russian territorial waters.,,249 This was the very area from which 
the Russian General Staff believed any possible U.S. nuclear surprise attack would 
probably come from.2SO Through a series of errors, including poor communications 
within the Russian bureaucracy, the Russians who needed to be informed did not get the 
letter the Norwegians sent them concerning the launch. The launch was detected by 
Russian radar staff and interpreted as a genuine nuclear threat. The Russian high 
command was notified that a nuciear attack was in progress.2S1 Although the case was 
eventually resolved, it has been described as an extremely dangerous incident, possibly 
the most dangerous incident of the atomic age.2S2 
Over the past six years, with poor funding and chaotic management, supervision 
of the control and management of Russia's nuclear weapons has been seen by the United· 
States as a serious security problem. American concerns over proliferation and risk of 
theft or misuse of nuclear weapons in Russia and other former Soviet republics led to the 
creation of the American Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program. The CTR program, also known as the "Nunn-Lugar" program, began in 1992 
and provides funds to assist the Russians and others with compliance with the START I 
treaty commitments. The program has focused on the safe dismantling and removal of 
nuclear weapons in efforts to reduce the tpreat of diversion or theft, and it has been 
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successful. The U.S. House of Representatives on 24 September 1998 approved a sharp 
increase in funding for this program in fiscal year 1999, including the destruction of 
intercontinental missiles, nuclear submarines and long-range bombers, as well as secure 
f d·· . I 253 storage 0 ra lOactlve matena s. 
Despite the successes of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, some reports 
indicate that a "progressive deterioration of Russian early warning and control represents 
a more serious threat than either of our governments is willing to acknowledge:,,254 This 
deterioration includes bomb-design laboratories, missile silos, submarines, and early-
warning systems that are affected by the economic situation. 
The situation of "disorder and despair among the guardians of its nuclear 
forces,,255 has meant that basic day-to-day supplies are lacking for highly trained workers, 
and that their families are without basic necessities 'such as food or money for school 
supplies.256 The security of Russian nuclear facilities of all sorts is' grave~y, impaired.257 
Russia's early-warning system is increasingly ineffective because many of the Soviet-era 
radar and satellite tracking sites are either in countries on Russia's periphery or are in 
very remote areas of Russia where poorly-paid officers and other personnel lack basic 
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necessities.258 Without adequate funding, Russian surveillance and early warning sites are 
developing capability deficits which will increase Russian feelings ofinsecurity.259 
258 David Hoffman, "Shattered Shield: Doctrine of Nuclear Forces. Doctrines of the Cold War Refuse to 




v. RUSSIA AND NATO - RUSSIAN COOPERATION 
The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation was signed on 27 May 1997, an arrangement aimed at 
providing Russia with firm security guarantees. Specifically, the Founding Act was 
created as a consequence of the need to address the distrust and sense of betrayal felt by 
Russia toward NATO and NATO expansion:260 
Ever since NATO began considering expansion, the Russians have opposed it. In 
December 1994 President Yeltsin delivered a "Cold Peace" speech at the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit which expressed Russian fears 
about a changed balance of power. The Y dtsin government claimed that "NATO was 
designed for the military and political containment of the USSR, and therefore expanding 
an unreconstructed Alliance m1J.st be aimed at weakening Moscow and giving the former 
a large measure of control over Russia's foreign and defense policy.,,261 The Russians 
suggested instead that "NATO should transform itself into a crisis management and 
peacekeeping organization. with a mandate from the UN Security Council and the 
OSCE.,,262 
260 Stanley Kober, "Russia's Search for Identity," NATO Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen 
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The sense that they have been the victims of treachery and bad faith has 
developed as a result of what the Russians feel has been an abrogation of the terms of a 
gentlemen's agreement between the Russians and the West that NATO would not 
expand. Although not actually written down in a formal agreement, a number of 
Russians contend that an understanding had been arrived at between Russia and the West 
that if the Russians agreed to the reunification of Germany, NATO would not expand to 
the east. 
Some authors assert that such an assurance was actually given, while others have 
offered grounds to question this view. According to Stanley Kober, discussions in 1990 
and 1991 may well have ended in .promises that were "well-meant and well-intentioned" 
by the Bush administration.263 In David Yost's account of these events, "In September 
1993, Russian president Boris Yeltsin noted that the September 1990 treaty on German 
reunification includes 'stipulations banning .the deployment of foreign troops in the 
eastern federal Lander of the Federal Republic of Germany,' and argued that 'The spirit 
of these stipulations rules out.any possibility of a NATO expansion eastwards.' Russians 
usually cite Mikhail Gorbachev as their authority in claiming that Moscow made an 
unwritten 'gentlemen's agreement' with the United States in February 1990 that NATO 
would not enlarge beyond the admission of the territory of the former East Germany into 
the united Germany.,,264 Although many Russians feel betrayed, the fact is that the 
Americans and their NATO allies did not in 1990-91 have any intention of expanding the 
263 Kober in Carpenter, 1998, 129-130. 
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Alliance. The Clinton administration, which came into office in January 1993,.did not at 
first plan to expand NATO. 
Some scholars see parallels between the betrayal Russia feels in the 1990s and the 
betrayal Russia felt in World War I in a comparable Balkan context.265 Observers have 
extrapolated from this sense of betrayal the prediction that in the current setting, Russia 
will again bide its time as it did after World War I, and at some time in the future express 
its bitterness and anger when it regains its strength.266 The parallel is not exact, with one 
difference being that this time the Russians have been offered participation in the NATO-
centered European security architecture as well as continuing participation in 
comprehensive institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Another difference is that Russia is now economically and 
socially prostrate in ways it was not after World War 1: Nevertheless, at some point in 
the future, the Russian situation could become unmanageable and NATO is wise to 
maintain its collective defense posture while pursuing opportunities for cooperation· and 
dialogue with Russia. 
The difficulties associated with assimilating Russia as a true partner of NATO 
reside partly in the fact that NATO at the pr,esent time is a collective defense organization 
that is being employed on a selective basis to conduct operations in support of collective 
security. NATO was originally created as a collective defense organization against 
possible Soviet aggression. It has now become an organ~zation that is evolving into a 
265 Kober, 1998, 129-130. 
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mechanism for conducting collective security operations that could include Russian 
participation, two potentially contradictory basic motivations that mean that NATO is 
now "actually a confusing hybrid that ignores the fundamental differences between a 
collective security organization and a traditional military alliance.,,267 
According to Charles Barry, "At present, Russia verbally opposes enlargement in 
spite of its foregone outcome. Key factors in Russian external affairs are its intent to 
maintain as large a Great Power role as possible, and to extract from the west the 
maximum assistance in turning around Russia's internal crisis (although Russia wants aid 
on its own terms to the extent it can make such demands).,,268 
Russian bitterness and anger are no doubt going to continue, despite the fact that 
the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act may seem like a significant step in 
changing Russian attitudes toward NATO. However, it is possible that President Boris 
Ye1tsin signed the NATO-Rus~ia Founding Act because of an opinion that Russia for 
some time has been too weakened and powerless to do otherwise. Because of Russia's 
devastating loss of geopolitical status, Ted Carpenter has argued, agreeing to the 
document was simply a case, of the Russians making the best of a difficult situation.269 
Some observers argue that Russia is being left out of the decision-making process 
in NATO's highest circles, except for the interactions in the NATO-Russia Permanent 
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Joint Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Russia is aware of this, and 
wants to cooperate on the "operational-tactical and strategic levels of interaction.,,27o 
Furthermore, the Russians complain that, while they are "ready to discuss with the United 
States serious aspects of our future strategic partnership,,,271 the Americans will not 
discuss these issues - a complaint that surprises the United States, which is cultivating 
dialogue and constructive cooperation with Russia. 
To facilitate communication and consultation with Russia on matters relating to 
security, NATO and Russia created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. 
Specifically, the NATO-Russia Founding Act states with regard to the practical carrying 
out of the provisions: 
NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military 
establishments, will expand political-military consultations and 
cooperation through the Permanent J<?int Council with an enhanced 
dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member 
States and of Russia. They will implement a program of significantly 
expanded militaiy activities and practical cooperation between NATO and 
Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint 
Council, this enhanced militaiy-to-military dialogue will be built upon the 
principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to 
disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military 
dialogue will include regularly scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO 
and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will 
include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training. 272 
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However, actual participation has been limited because, while Russia has played a 
practical role in the peacekeeping efforts of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, it chafes at the 
fact that it has been left out of NATO's top-level strategic decision-making process - the 
North Atlantic Council. Russian participation in the NATO-led collective security 
operation in the Balkans has to date been successful. Early reports about the efficacy of 
these arrangements showed, predictably, that progress had been patchy, at the beginning. 
With such a devastating change in its status, Russia's progress on the road to cooperation 
has been predictably bumpy and confusion reigns. To cite an instance, as. of late May 
1998 the Russians had promised to make progress some time ~uring 1998 in allowing 
NATO to set up a liaison office in the Defense Ministry in Moscow. However, no 
progress so far has been noted, although at "NATO military headquarters outside of 
Brussels, the 'Russian military recently set up a small Spartan office to help plan joint 
military exercises.,,273 Additionally, Russia has not been "able to participate in the 
alliance's programs for sharing military technology because Moscow has not· yet 
concluded an agreement on how to handle sensitive NATO documents.,,274 
The Russians reportedly do not always seem to know what to make of the new 
relationship with NATO, and have in some :vays misused it by reverting to old Soviet-era 
behavior patterns. For example, "Russian diplomats have sought to use the new council 
to extract commitments they were unable to negotiate during the talks over the Founding 




Act. Russian diplomats have pressed for detailed information about the bases and storage 
sites NATO plans to use on the territory of its new members.,,275 
In spite of the mistrust on both sides, efforts to cooperate continue and positive 
statements are issued from time to time. Almost exactly a year after the signing of the 
NATO-Russia Fouding Act, a meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was 
held at the ministerial level in Luxembourg, on 28 May 1998, after which a statement was 
issued which emphasized that NATO and Russia will continue working together to 
contribute to common and comprehensive security in the Euro-Atlantic area based on 
allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all 
states. The statement "welcomed the establishment of Russia's mission to NATO and the 
appointment of the Senior Russian Military Representative in its framework.,,276 
Moreover, the Ministers stressed the need to move ahead with Russia's Individual 
Partnership Program under Partnership for Peace, as agreed in the Permanent Joint 
Council Work Program for 1998. 
Positive efforts notwithstanding, NATO's cautious policy toward Russia is wise. 
For example, one of the most significant statements in the NATO-Russia Founding Act is 
. . 
that "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries.,,277 However, the 
soothing phrases in this document should not simply be taken at face value. 
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During U.S. House of Representatives National Security Committee hearings held 
on 4 August 1998, the committee heard testimony from Colonel Stanislav Lunev, the 
highest-ranking GRU officer ever to defect to the West. "Since [his defection in] 1992 
Lunev has served as a consultant on intelligence matters for the FBI and the CIA.,,278 
According to Representative Curt Weldon, "The most significant part of Colonel Lunev's 
testimony, in my opinion, is his allegation that the Russian military and intelligence 
services still regard the United States as the enemy ... [and assume] that ultimately the 
U.S. will be Russia's long-term enemy - [and that their leadership] considers a war with 
the U.S. as likely or even inevitable, and are actively planning for a third World War. 
According to Colonel Lunev, so seriously does the Russian military regard the possibility 
of war with the United States that nuclear suitcase bombs may already be pre-positioned 
somewhere in the vicinity of Washington ·or ~ew York.,,279 Furthermore, as Weldon 
points out, "Colonel Lunev's description of the dire threat perceptions of the Russian 
military and the GRU contrast sharply with the [Clinton] administration's comforting 
assurances that the U.S. and Russia are now strategic partners and no longer regard each 
other as threats.,,280 
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A. NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
On the more practical side, the hopes of NATO for future cooperation with Russia 
rest especially on the hope that generational change will mean changes of attitude 
conducive to the cooperation agenda. Furthermore, it is hoped that the "simple day-to-
day experience of working together will help, toO.,,281 The most notable example of 
NATO-Russia cooperation has been peacekeeping in Bosnia. 
The principal venue for practical Russia-NATO cooperation on the day-to-day 
working level has been the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the IFORJSFOR peacekeeping 
operations in the former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1997, the enhanced Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) were set up as a venue to 
facilitate cooperation and to incrt?ase transparency. 
Created originally in late January 1994282 as an outreach program (or for some 
states, an alternative path to NATO) that could embed Russia in an "institutional web,,,283 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was intended to serve as an institutional vehicle to 
produce stability by integrating Russia into cooperation with Western economic and 
security institutions. 
Although the PfP was originally viewed with skepticism by critics who thought it 
was a "stalling tactic,,284 to avoid offending countries refused first tranche admission to 
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NATO, PfP has in fact been reported to be very successfu1.285 However, because of its 
devastating loss of geopolitical status, integrating Russia into active participation has 
been a special problem, and Russia hesitated about signing up until 22 June 1994, when 
Russia did sign the Partnership Framework Document.286 In fact, even though Russia 
now has functioning military units in both Bosnia and Albania, "the post-Cold War 
degradation of Russia's armed forces has also been detrimental to efforts to interact with 
the U.S. military establishment and to implement the Partnership for Peace program with 
NATO.,,287 
In terms of "equipment and combat readiness," the Russian military continues to 
deteriorate. The exception is the formation of 1,400 soldiers the Russians have deployed 
to Bosnia as peacekeepers - a unit for which NATO is paying most of the costS.
288 
1. Practical Considerations 
To have a practical facilitating a~ for consultation and· communication, an 
organizationa1.structure had to be set ·up to coordinate the activities of the PfP. This 
structure is the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) established in June 1994. This was 
so successful that "in l~ss than two years, the PCC has become the largest multinational 
military headquarters in NATO - bringing together 36 nationalities under one roof.,,289 
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At present, the pee command group has a Danish general directing a pennanent 
staff element of NATO officers, plus liason officers from twenty-one partner states. The 
pee improves consultation, communication, and coordination in the pursuit of common 
security objectives. Education, training and workshops for partners and members have 
been held since 1994. The "development of the pee structure facilitated the coordination 
and participation of Partner contributions to NATO's IFOR.,,290 
B. IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR) 
The crisis in the fonner Yugoslavia led NATO to assume peacekeeping 
responsibilites.291 With the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping 
efforts foundering because of its failures in preventing "atrocities, stopping the fighting,· 
and bringing about a settlement,,,292 NATO decided to act to enforce the UN-mandated 
no-fly zone. On 28 February 1994, ''NATO shot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft. This 
was significant in NATO's history as the Alliance's first use of deadlY force.,,293 
EventuaI.ly, this led to the opportunity for Russian participation in a NATO-led 
peacekeeping operation. The institutional framework was the Implementation Force 
(IF OR) for the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (commonly 
called the Dayton Accords) established in late 1995, a NATO-led peacekeeping effort. 
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Although Russia did not at first want its troops to be under NATO command, a 
compromise was worked out. The military control of a Russian brigade, from the 98th 
Guards Airborne Division, operating in an American division would be commanded by a 
Russian general who would "in tum report to U.S. General George Joulwan, NATO's top 
commander. ,,294 
In July 1998, the reports of success were very favorable. The Russians have 
proven especially useful in helping NATO to deal with the Serbian parties to the 
conflict.295 Major Charles J. McLaughlin, U.S. Army, has praised the professionalism 
and success of the combined NATO-Russia efforts.296 
In order to monitor compliance with "the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina" (the Dayton Accords), Operation Joint Endeavor was set up by IFOR. 
The two main missions of Operation Joint Endeavor were to (1) maintain cessation of· 
hostilities and to (2) prevent episodes of interference with the civilian populace. Both of 
these missions were successful, and were combined with infrastructure repairs and 
mineclearing.297 The efficient exchange of infonnation was facilitated by the creation of 
parallel administrative units called Joint Military Commissions. About a year after the 
Implementation Force was operational, the implementation of at least some elements of 
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the Dayton Accords having been fairly effectively achieved, the point was reached for the 
creation of a stabilizing force. 
C. STABILIZATION FORCE (SFOR) 
The Stabilization Force, which followed the Implementation Force, was the 
NATO-created Operation Joint Guard, set up in December 1996. This force was smaller 
than IFOR, and its task was to prevent the resumption of hostilities, provide security in 
local elections, and to furnish aid in reconstruction efforts by the local authorities. 298 The 
task of bringing indicted war criminals to prosecution was not emphasized for various 
reasons, including the need to maintain impartiality and to avoid Russian protests in favor 
of the Serbs.299 
D. PROSPECTS FOR NATO-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN 
CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS 
Some excellent progress in NATO-Russia cooperation has been made. In 
September 1997, the first ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 
Council was held in New York. It was followed by agreement "on an extensive Work 
Program for 1998, covering a wide array of topics of consultation and cooperative 
activities, such as peacekeeping, defense conversion, defense-related environmental 
i,ssues and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.,,30o Moreover, the Russian 
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Parliament and the Federation Council decided in July 1998 to maintain Russia's 1,400 
. B . 301 troops III osma. 
As the Russian Ministry of Defense has pointed out, "Russian representatives 
constantly interact with the American representatives, with representatives of European 
countries and in the course of these contacts present their views to each other.,,302 
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry considers that the Russian and 
NATO cooperative efforts in Bosnia have to some extent successfully eased Russian fears 
of NATO.303 The Russians themselves have given positive reports of effective NATO-
R . . 304 ussla cooperatIOn. 
On 19 June 1998, to mark the first anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding· 
Act, a workshop was held at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences 
(INION) in Moscow as "part of the 1998 Work Program of the NATO-Russia Permanent 
Joint Council. The workshop brought together for the first time civilian and military 
policy practitioners from NATO and Russia with a group of scholars from 14 NATO 
countries and from Moscow and regional Russian universities. Some 90 Workshop 
participants reviewed the achievements of the first year of NATO-Russia cooperation 
under the Founding Act, and furthermore discussed ideas for further cooperation in a 
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wide range of areas, including peacekeeping, science, civil emergency planning, 
armaments cooperation and retraining of retired servicemen.,,305 
The Russians report that they are "prepared to be cooperative with NATO in 
Kosovo and [are] contemplating joint exercises with NATO.306 Secondly, they 
acknowledge the praise offered by NATO of their peacekeeping units in Bosnia, and 
admit that they have responded to "the obligation to the European community and to 
NATO to make President Slobodan Milosevic more restrained, [and] to induce him to 
take a number ofpositiv~ steps.,,307 
E. NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS CONCERNING NUC.LEAR ISSUES 
Three nuclear issues appear most significant: 
• Russian anxieties regarding NATO enlargement and hypothetical NATO 
deployments of nuclear weapons on the territory of new allies, 
• NATO's concerns about Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons; and 
• NATO's interest in gaining Russia's cooperation to deal with NBC 
proliferation. 
1. The Four No's Policy 
One of the most controversial points of the debate in Russia over NATO 
enlargement concerns the hypothetical deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of 
new members. The NATO Allies have clearly stated in the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
of May 1997 that they have "no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear 
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weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's 
nuclear posture or nuclear policy. Furthermore, they do not foresee any future need to do 
so. This includes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no 
reason to establish nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of those new members, 
whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old 
1 Co '1" ,,308 nuc ear storage laCl ltIes. 
The phrase "storage facilities," it should be noted, refers to nuclear weapons 
storage sites, and not to "the creation of storage facilities in central Europe, in the event 
that a stationing of Western troops is required.,,309 In other words, although the 
provisioning and training of troops are continuing, this does not include the deployment 
of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new allies (Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary). 
This policy is subject to change, depending on the evolution of circumstances. It 
simply is not possible to state finally and categorically that "nuclear weapons will never 
be deployed under any circumstances on the territory ofthe new allies." 
According to a Russ~an commentator, commitments such as the statement in the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act overlook the fact "that a binding agreement between NATO 
and Russia would be relevant only in times of peace. rf serious military tension were to 
308 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 1997, 7-8. 
309 Eyal, 1997, 718. 
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develop between the two sides, which is highly unlikely, any standing agreement would 
become irre1evant.,,31o 
Various circumstances might cause a change in this policy: for instance, a change 
in the government of Russia to policies of neo-imperialism and belligerence; a change in 
the political alignments of the countries of Europe, including Russia; or a renewed arms 
race in another part of the globe. 
Russia claims to want to participate in Euro-Atlantic security arrangements with 
the West. 311 However, some Russians have threatened to form other sorts of alliances that 
are not helpful to the West. 312 Russia's "policy is opportunistic, incoherent and based on . 
fundamentally flawed instincts. But, it will remain Russia's policy for years to come.,,313 
These instincts and attitudes include Russia's tendency to see itself as a victim of historic 
injustices. Russia may be unable, because ofth~ present turmoil in its society, to proceed 
on a logical and practical path to obtaining security. 
The Russians have their own reasons to distrust NATO's Four No's Policy. For 
example, as noted in Chapter II, some Russians claim that there was a more or less 
implicit guarantee by President George Bush to President Mikhail Gorbachev at Malta in 
1989 that the West would "not seek to profit" from Moscow's weaknesses.314 
Subsequently came the so-called "promise-breaking" of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
310 Pushkov, 1997,60. 
311 Ibid., 62. 
312 Eyal, 718. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid., 698. 
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(who emphatically denies he made such a promise), who (some Russians claim) stated 
that "NATO would never expand in central Europe if a united Germany were allowed to 
remain within the alliance.,,315 Owing in part to their perceptions and convictions 
regarding these unwritten "understandings," the Russians are clearly skeptical about 
NATO statements having to do with NATO enlargement.3lG One manifestation of 
Russian distrust may be the fact that current Russian nuclear modernization plans call for 
the hardening of nuclear command and control sites, and the construction of new deep 
underground facilities designed to survive a nuclear war.317 
2. NATO's Concerns -. Russia's Non-Strategic N1:Iclear Weapons 
The Russians continue to rely on tactical nuclear weapons as the principal defense 
in their nuclear arsenal. "In the event of a crisis or hostilities, tactical nuclear weapons 
are probably the least-controlled element of the Russian nuclear arsenal-and the ones 
most likely to be employed.,,318 
Furthermore, "the security management of these weapons does not meet NATO 
standards.,,319 A recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report has concluded that 
Russian controls and management of tactical nuclear weapons are inadequate and that the 
315 Ibid., 699. 
316 Kober, 1998, 130-131. 
317 Congress, House, House National Security Committee, the Military Research and Development 
Subcommittee on U.S. National Security Issues, Capitol Hill Hearing with Defense Department Personnel, 
105th Cong:, 4 August 1998, Federal Information Service, Unpaged, Nexis, Online. 
318 Stephen P. Lambert, and David A. Miller. "Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An 




risk of unauthorized use is high.320 Moreover, there are recent credible reports of eighty 
to one-hundred portable tactical nuclear weapons, the so-called "suitcase bombs," which 
cannot be accounted for.321 
According to Colonel Stanislav Lunev, while the safety of the strategic nuclear 
arsenal is substantially assured because highly trained people under the Special 
Directorate handle it, the dangerous area is in tactical nuclear weapons.322 Lunev adds 
that Russia today is ruled by a mix of "industrial monsters, financial magnates, criminals, 
law enforcement agencies, leaders and high-level officials, all of them together plus 
former Communist party high-level bureaucrats,,,323 with no clear demarcation between 
government and criminal infrastructure, between legitimate and illegitimate interests. 324 
According to Colonel Lunev, these entities are intermingled, and have "penetrated" each 
other, including law enforcement, which is taking money from the criminal 
infrastructure.325 As Representative Weldon points out, nine banking .~d financial 
families are "siphoning off the bulk ~fthe money that the IMP" has provided.326 Colonel 
Lunev suggested the IMP loan money should not go to the central bank but rather to the 
regional banks, which are less corrupt than the central bank.327 
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With respect to improved understanding of Russia's stewardship of nuclear 
weapons, NATO has to date had little success. Efforts by NATO to set up a formal 
exchange of information between Russia and NATO on the disposition and stewardship 
of tactical nuclear weapons were not successful, and NATO personnel reported 
disappointing results. When pressed for details about safety procedures and the numbers 
of weapons in the stockpile, the Russians were evasive.328 
Regarding treaties governing nuclear weapons, the Russians answer yes to the 
question of whether Russia's nonratification of START II is an obstacle to discussing 
"with the United States serious aspects of our future strategic partnership.,,329 
Specifically, according to Chief Minister Colonel General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov, 
of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the failure to complete the START II ratification 
process has complicated "cooperatIon in such areas as anti-ballistic missiles defense, 
military-technical cooperation, and so on~,,330 Moreover, Russians assert that the 
Americans will not discuss these issues as well as "the process of further limitation and 
reduction of strategic nuclear forces.,,33l Furthermore, this stalemate has hampered 
progress on START III concerning sea-based cruise missiles, and consequently this has 
had a spillover effect on Russia-NATO relations.332 
328 William Drozdiak, "The Next Step for NATO: Handling Russia. A peeved Moscow seems to be balking 
over the security issues," Washington Post Weekly Edition, 11 May 1998, 15. 





When asked whether the strategic nuclear forces are the "only remaining 
efficient" part of the Russian armed forces, Minister Ivashov downplayed the importance 
of strategic nuclear weapons, saying that the only aim of nuclear weapons is deterrence. 
Minister Ivashov said that the destruction of other nations is not the aim of the Russians 
and that consideration of their operational use is "madness. ,,333 Furthermore, "the stand of 
the Defense Ministry is that we should reduce this nuclear ceiling to reasonable levels. 
There is no need to spend money on ideas that have no future." In his view, the threshold 
of "unacceptable damage has been brought down.,,334 Unacceptable damage criteria can 
be satisfied to achieve nuclear deterrence, according to these Russians, with a strategic 
nuclear ceiling at 2,500 warheads.335 Similarly "the opponents of the ratification of 
START II argue that by complying with the treaty, the most effective part of [Russia's] 
strategic triad - the heavy missiles [would be impacted].,,336 In any case, the issue will be 
mooted by the five-year extension that was made by an agreement between President 
Yeltsin and President Clinton, because in five years, according to the Russians, "these 







3. NATO - Russian Cooperation in Efforts to Promote Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (NBC) 
The Russians have professed an interest in promoting nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons nonproliferation, and in working with NATO in this regard. Russian 
actions have; however, not always conformed to Russia's declared intentions. 
Ac~ording to Lunev, in 1991 Soviet President Gorbachev cancelled the USSR's 
research and development of chemical and biological weapons, but work on their 
development had resumed by "the end of 1991 or 1992.,,338 Moreover, Russia's chemical 
and biological weapons efforts continue under the cover of so-called "dual-use" 
pharmaceutical and chemical research and development. 339 
In addition, there is evidence the Russians are training Iranians in nuclear 
technology in Russian universities. Furthermore, the Russians have transferred sensitive 
technology to Iran, 340 including medium range missiles.341 The U.S. imposed sanctions 
against seven Russian economic enterprises· that sold technologies to Iran 'that could be 
used to create delivery systems for nuclear weapons.342 The Russian motives include 
financial incentives as well as a desire to enlist Iranian aid in cQntrolling Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
338 Lunev, cited in Hearings, 4 August 1998. 
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India has also received military-technical assistance from Russia. India is the 
largest purchaser of Russian weapons systems. "More than 60 percent of the Indian 
army's hardware, 70 percent of the navy's equipment, and 80 percent of the Indian Air 
Force's equipment is of Russian origin. Indian defense contracts keep about 800 Russian 
defense plants in operation, according to some estimates.,,343 Russia also provides 
"valuable assistance to India's space program and its nuclear power industry.,,344 India is 
said to share the Russian antipathy to a world order dominated by the United States. 
Furthermore, India is said to have been designated by the Russians as a so-called 
"strategic partner.,,345 
343 Igor Kbripunov, "From Russia, a Muted Reaction; Response to India's Nuclear Testing" The Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 17 July 1998, 66. 
344 Ibid., 67. 




A. THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONS 
The domestic scene in Russia has altered dramatically from what it was in 1991, 
but the necessary governmental and socioeconomic adaptations to fully integrate Russia 
into Western economic, political, and security institutions have failed to develop. Russia 
is not likely to become a true partner of NATO because its strategic culture has not 
changed in ways that would make Russian policies and institutional frameworks 
compatible with those of NATO countries in the economic,. social, technological, and 
military spheres. Russia will probably remain stalled and stalemated by its lack of 
efficient economic institutions, including reliable third-party enforcement of contracts, 
and hampered by its traditions and cultural prejudices. 
This situation has not derived from Rllssia's hostility to the expansion of NATO, 
but rather from the inability of the leadership to set up mechanisms that the Russian 
government could use to accomplish the transition from the state-centered command 
economy to a market-centered free-enterprise economy. At the present time the legal, 
judicial, and regulatory institutions that support commercial transations and private 
property rights are lacking. The government has failed to create effective and fair 
judicial, regulatory, taxation, and hl.w enforcement systems. Russia's current constitution 
is art ineffective document that lacks popular legitimacy partly because "its language 
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could not be used for defending most of the rights it gives, such as private property.,,346 
Russia currently has a "pseudo-constitution" with a system of presidential primacy,347 in 
which the President may, if he wishes, rule by decree. Nevertheless, Russia suffers from 
a "weak state syndrome. ,,348 The federal government in Russia is weak in that the local 
and regional authorities may disregard its decrees as they see fit. The local authorities 
have developed systems of self-sufficiency (partly a carry-over from the Soviet system) 
of varying degrees of formality and legality, and various "groups within the society have 
the means to resist reform and state controls.,,349 Russian society has developed sufficient 
strength to resist efforts at effective economic restructuring. According to William 
Odom, an American authority on Russian affairs, "A weak state syndrome can last for-
decades without resolving itself and without a total collapse.,,35o To change a weak state 
syndrome, it is necessary to have an effective state bureaucracy. The Russian' federal 
government lacks an effective bureacracy, however. 
The tra.n.:sition in the economy has been further stalemated by an inability to 
convert from the old Soviet command economy. Privatization would result in a work 
force paid on a regular basis by private enterprise. Instead, at the present time, out of a 
workforce of sixty-seven million people, only twenty-seven million work in the private 
sector; the remaining forty million are in the state sector. Taxes collected from the 
346 William E. adorn, Prepared Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations, 16 July 






private sector pay the wages of the huge forty million strong state sector, a situation that 
is unsustainable and unmanageable.351 
Some Western analysts contend that the reason for the stalemate is ignorance. 
That is, the Russians have failed to create the right institutions to support transition 
because of their ignorance of management principles. According to this school of 
thought, Russian officials and entrepreneurs have a "huge knowledge gap,,352 concerning 
modem business methods. 
Another explanation for Russia's inability to set up economic mechanisms to 
facilitate the pursuit of prosperity and full participation in Western economic institutions 
is the dominance of a culture in which accountability and transparency are foreign 
concepts. Without accountability, transparency, and guaranteed property rights, investor 
confidence has evaporated. Massive capital flight has followed. In fact, July 1998 data 
indicate that $99 billion of infu~ions of foreign capital have gone int~ Russia while about 
$103 billion have left Russia in capital flight. 353 This evident lack of confidence in the 
future economic development of Russia and the obvious lack of commitment to building 
a prosperous future have c<;mtributed to the general cynicism of Russia's citizens. This 
situation has further undermined foreign investor confidence. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ariel Cohen, "How the West Lost the Battle for Russia's Future," Prepared Testimony before the House 
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B. THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY 
The Russian transition to democracy has failed because the people have "lost faith 
in the open election process" and because they lack confidence that the outcome is based 
on fair voting practices.354 As in economic affairs and government institution-building, 
the democratic process is affected by the fact that accountability and transparency are 
foreign concepts in the Russian political culture. 
After Russia's inevitably disappointing experiment with pseudo-democracy and 
unfortunate experience with a grossly distorted form of capitalism, the Russians are now 
in a condition of economic collapse and social catastrophe, with the great majority of the 
Russian people deprived of an ad~quate standard of living. Although politically they 
have more freedom, the majority of the Russian people may be worse off materially than 
they were under communism. Among the younger generation of Russians, there is a 
sense of disillusionment that hopes and desires for a prosperous and modem Russia have 
not materialized.355 Unemployment is on the rise, and the emergence of a dissatisfied and 
restless youthful segment of the population may become a volatile political factor. 
After the disillusionment accompanying the apparent failure of the experiment 
with nominally democratic institutions, some Russians have turn~d to psychological 
defense mechanisms to help them deal with the feelings of disappointment and 
354 Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Old', 'New', and 'Post' Liberal Attitudes Toward the West: From Love to 
Hate,'-' Michigan State University, 20 August 1998, 12. 
355 David Hoffman, "In Russia, Hopes Dimmed But Not Extinguished," Washington Post, 14 September 
1998, 12. 
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inferiority. These mechanisms have included scapegoating.356 The Russians continue to 
be both envious and contemptuous of NATO countries, particularly the United States. 
However, the Russian elites have long had "an exceedingly complex and often 
contradictory" attitude toward the West.357 Public opinion studies confirm that the 
Russians think of themselves principally as a Western country; the Russians consider 
Asian cultures deeply alien.358 Nevertheless many Russians deem their cultUre morally 
superior to that of the West,359 while at the same time they are suffering from a national 
"inferiority complex," p~icularly owing to their loss of superpower status.36? 
Furthermore, some Russian elites have responded to their failures by denigrating 
American culture and values.361 This denigration stems in part from the moral 
indignation felt by the Russians, who "assumed that the entire world (especially 
prosperous countries) was morally obligated to help Russia build a new economy.,,362 
Recent opinion surveys conducted by Michigan State University indicate that persistent 
myths in Russia include the notion that the West is hostile to Russia, and that this is 
particularly true of Germany and the United States.363 Moreover, it is now considered 
"mainstream" in some Russian scholarly circles to be critical of Western ideas.364 Despite 
356 Shlapentokh,13. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid., 1. 
359 Ibid., 10. 
360 Ibid., 16. 
361 Ibid., 17. 
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viewing the West as hostile toward them, the Russians do not seriously fear the outbreak 
of war, although they would like to regain "military parity with the United States.,,365 
C. RUSSIA'S GEOPOLITICAL STANCE 
The new Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, believes that the West is 
not a friend, but a relentless riva1.366 Nevertheless, he may bring stability by helping to 
shore up Russian pride, especially among nationalist and Communist parties. He may 
give the Russians some hope that Russia will be restored to the status of a superpower. 
Primakov is likely to do this by undermining American influence wherever he can, by 
refusing to support American decisions in the Balkans and the Middle East, and by 
limiting the latitude for maneuver of other countries as much as possible. On the other 
hand, Primakov was pragmatic enough to . make the arrangements for Russia's 
participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission, so that Russia can continue to play an 
important role in the politics of t.be region. 
Crop failures and low food stores have led to the likelihood of food shortages 
during the coming winter. The Russian government has found it necessary to play the 
. role of a petitioner reques,ting emergency deliveries of food from the international 
community. Due to Russia's need for help and its reliance on generosity from Western 
countries, including help from international monetary institutions, as well as Russia's 
continuing desire to be part of the "G8," the Russians will probably maintain a somewhat 
cooperative attitude in their relations with the West. For the next decade or so, at least in 
365 Ibid., 22-23. 
366 Ibid., 13. 
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the foreign policy arena, Russia will probably display an apparent attitude of peacefulness 
and prickly cooperation with NATO alliance countries, including the United States.367 
It is likely that Russia will continue to rely upon nuclear weapons as its ultimate 
defense, and it is possible that money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will 
be used to support the Russian military. 368 The Russians have regularly received large 
IMF loans. However, some Russian think tanks, such as !NOBIS, have accused the IMF 
and the World Bank of devising policies to destroy Russia's manufacturing and 
technology infrastructure. Some Russians have argued that Western economic 
institutions wish to subject Russia to the colonial status of a raw materials provider in 
order to "keep it from turning into an economically, politically and militarily influential 
force. ,,369 
Primakov and other Russian leaders are likely to seek an eventual return to 
greatness for Russia, defined in terms of military power and imperial expansion. Efforts 
to recover Russian strength, military capability and strategic power are likely to persist. 
One ofthe elements of Russian power will remain the country's nuclear weapons. 
Dangerous new, tensions may arise between Russia and NATO concerning nuclear 
weapons. The Russian military, demoralized and underpaid, with outdated or poorly-
maintained equipment for monitoring and surveillance of international affairs, has 
become subject to anxiety and possible misinterpretation of events, a situation which 
367 Ibid., 26. 
368 0dorn, 16 July 1998. 
369 Surikov, 1995,2. 
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could lead to strategic miscalculation. As Bruce Blair has observed, "the Russian defense 
establishment is more suspicious of the West than most observers imagine, the nuclear 
threshold is lower than commonly perceived, and the domestic and international context 
is a more pivotal factor in Russian threat assessment than is normally recognized. Worse, 
perhaps, the danger of Russian nuclear miscalculation is not as remote as many suppose, 
and the progressive deterioration of Russian early warning and control represents a more 
serious threat than either of our governments is willing to acknowledge.,,37o 
According to Peter Pry, "Russian and Western threat perceptions are likely to 
remain poles apart, if only because their internal realities are as different as night and day. 
The West takes peace and prosperity for granted, but Russia knows neither of these and is 
highly unstable.,,371 Yeltsin himself has acknowledged that another coup attempt could 
occur under some circumstances. However, Yeltsin added, "Danger rather lies elsewhere. 
There is still a visible trend toward the search for an enemy and an uncompromising all-
out struggle in Russia .. " [T]hese are the consequences of many years of life under the 
conditions of a totalitarian state. And they will not disappear overnight.,,372 
370 Blair, Summer 1998, 88; emphasis in the original. 
371 Pry, 1997,234. 
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Source: Central Intelligence Agency. Available online at 
[http://www .odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/country-
frame.html]; accessed 8 December 1998. 
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